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CAN THE BLIND LEAD THE BLIND?  RETHINKING EQUAL 
PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE THROUGH AN EMPIRICAL 
EXAMINATION OF BLIND PEOPLE’S UNDERSTANDING OF RACE 
Osagie K. Obasogie∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Lay understandings of race largely attribute its salience—why race is a noticeable, conspicuous, 
and striking aspect of human relations—to its visual obviousness.  To the extent that law often 
reflects lay understandings of social phenomena, I show in this Article that equal protection 
jurisprudence has similarly come to orient around the idea that the salience, coherence, and 
perceptibility of race stems from visually obvious cues (skin color, facial features, etc.) that are self-
evidently known and exist apart from any broader social or legal process.  I call this equal 
protection’s “race” ipsa loquitur trope; race is thought to speak for itself.  For courts, the moral, 
legal, and conceptual salience of race stems from a reductionist account that largely treats it as a 
visually obvious attribute that is self-evidently known by simple observation. 
“Race” ipsa loquitur has influenced the Court’s administration of equal protection in at least 
three areas.  First, the tiered system of scrutiny used to determine the appropriate level of review 
(strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review) for laws burdening particular 
groups’ privileges, in large part, racial minorities and groups with visible race-like traits while 
affording lesser scrutiny to others.  The presumably self-evident nature of race largely justifies the 
Court’s heightened judicial solicitude for racial minorities.  Second, the Court’s embracing of 
colorblindness as a normative framework for understanding equal protection’s boundaries is 
driven by a visual metaphor that frames race and discrimination as quintessentially visual 
experiences.  Since it is largely believed that blindness or not being able to see distinctions in color 
diminishes a person’s ability to understand race, the Court’s colorblind approach attempts to 
transcend racial antagonisms through a jurisprudence of racial non-recognition that, by being 
“blind” to color, is thought to mimic blind people’s racially utopian experiences.  Third, the post-
Washington v. Davis intent doctrine that has come to stand for the need to demonstrate 
individual malice to sustain claims of discrimination similarly frames race as a self-evident trait 
whose salience is thought to exist on its own terms (apart from social structure and racial 
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hierarchy) to render a reductionist conception where race is simply visually obvious.  
The centrality of “race” ipsa loquitur to equal protection jurisprudence raises a critical question 
that has yet to be addressed by the literature:  does the salience of race—the ability to see and 
differentiate among human groups—turn on obvious visual cues?  This Article presents an 
alternative viewpoint that critiques equal protection’s emphasis on visibility by empirically 
examining the experiences and understanding of race among people without vision, i.e. blind 
people.  The data collected from these respondents empirically isolates the significance of vision to 
the salience of race as a sociological manner, which provides empirical data to critically assess this 
theory of race in equal protection law.  I find not only that blind people’s conception of race is as 
robust as those with vision, but that they also understand race visually.  Moreover, I also find that 
institutional and interpersonal interactions produce blind people’s visual sensibility regarding 
race.  This evidence suggests that the visual salience of race is not merely an ocular phenomenon 
but a social one, which belies the “race” ipsa loquitur understanding of race embedded in equal 
protection doctrine and scholarship.  
This research and its findings are important for equal protection in that they empirically 
destabilize the “race” ipsa loquitur trope enmeshed in this jurisprudence.  It also offers data 
demonstrating how the embedded assumption throughout these three areas of equal protection fails 
to appreciate the ways in which this salience is produced by constitutive social practices that make 
human difference visible in particular ways.  I argue, as a normative matter, that “race” ipsa 
loquitur must be thoroughly eviscerated from equal protection; it is simply an inaccurate and 
therefore inappropriate framework from which to understand race. The theory of race driving equal 
protection must be reconstructed around the social practices shown by this Article to produce the 
salience of race that has been mistakenly assumed to be self-evident for far too long.  I conclude by 
discussing why it is important for the Court to have an empirically accurate understanding of how 
race becomes salient and how re-orienting equal protection’s theory of race around social practices 
can re-introduce the important roles of social context and racial hierarchy in generating a just and 
equitable jurisprudence. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION:  LAW AND THE VISUAL SALIENCE OF RACE 
Leonard Rhinelander was the socialite son of a wealthy New York family.  
In the fall of 1921, he met Alice Jones through her sister Grace and the 
couple quickly became quite fond of each other.  On at least two occasions 
during their first few months together, the couple—Alice was then twenty-
two, four years Leonard’s senior—secluded themselves for days in New York 
City hotels where they were intimate.1  Over the next few years, Leonard 
took several extended trips at his father’s request that separated the couple, 
but they remained in touch through frequent letters proclaiming their love 
for one another.  Leonard returned to New York in May of 1924, and the 
couple secretly married that October, as Leonard’s family was not fond of 
the former Ms. Jones.  The couple lived in secret with Alice’s family for 
about a month, until a story appeared in the Standard Star, a local paper in 
New Rochelle, titled:  “Rhinelanders’ Son Marries the Daughter of a Colored 
Man.”2  Thus, a wealthy White man from 1920s New York high society was 
exposed as having committed one of the biggest social faux pas one could 
imagine at the time:  marrying a Black woman. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 Angela Onwuachi-Willig, A Beautiful Lie:  Exploring Rhinelander v. Rhinelander as a 
Formative Lesson on Race, Identity, Marriage, and Family, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2393, 2408 (2007). 
 2 Id. at 2409. 
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Alice Jones with her mother and father.3 
Alice was the biracial daughter of an English mother and a father 
described as “a bent, dark complexioned man who is bald, except for a 
fringe of curly white hair.”4  A few days after the story broke, Leonard was 
shown a copy of Alice’s birth certificate that documented her race as Black.  
Two weeks later, Leonard filed suit for an annulment.5  The reason?  Fraud:  
Leonard alleged that Alice misrepresented that she was not colored to trick 
him into marrying her.  The stage was now set for what some might 
characterize as, up until then, the race trial of the century:  a legal 
determination of whether Alice committed fraud by “passing” as White or if 
Leonard knew Alice’s race before their marriage.  Put differently, the 
question became what did Leonard know and, more importantly, what 
should he have known? 
The strategy developed by Isaac Mills, Leonard’s attorney, portrayed him 
as mentally challenged and Alice’s physical features as racially ambiguous.  
The defense from Alice’s counsel, Lee Parsons Davis, was quite simple:  
 
 3 Alice Rhinelander with her Mother and Father, 1925 (© Bettmann/CORBIS). 
 4 EARL LEWIS & HEIDI ARDIZZONE, LOVE ON TRIAL:  AN AMERICAN SCANDAL IN BLACK AND 
WHITE 25 (2001). 
 5 Angela Onwuachi-Willig notes that: 
An annulment, as opposed to a divorce, would sever ties completely between the 
Rhinelanders and Joneses because it would place Leonard and Alice back into 
their original positions as unmarried persons and, by law, would entirely erase 
their marital union.  Also, in many cases, an annulment importantly left the 
fraudulent party with no claim to alimony or property and thereby was essential if 
the Rhinelander family wanted Alice to have no, or at least very little, access to 
Leonard’s or the family’s assets.  Finally, an annulment was critical because finding 
that Alice was a colored woman without obtaining an annulment would forever 
mark Leonard as unmarriageable for a more “suitable” wife, meaning a white 
woman of the same socioeconomic station and background, and also as unsuitable 
for the Rhinelander family name. 
  Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1, at 2411. 
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there was no fraud as Alice’s blackness was visually obvious.  Davis mockingly 
said to the jury: 
I think the issue that Judge Mills should have presented to you was not 
mental unsoundness but blindness.  Blindness . . . [Y]ou are here to 
determine whether Alice Rhinelander before her marriage told this man 
Rhinelander that she was white and had no colored blood.  You are here 
to determine next whether or not that fooled him.  Whether or not he 
could not see with his own eyes that he was marrying into a colored 
family.6 
After raising serious doubts about Leonard’s cognitive disability, much of 
Davis’ defense rested on showing that Alice’s race could be known by simply 
looking at her body.  This became a central theme in Davis’ argument; he 
repeatedly asked Alice and her sisters to stand up and show the jury their 
hands and arms.  But to hammer home this point, Davis wanted the jury to 
see all of Alice’s body—not just hands and arms that might darken over time 
with routine exposure to sunlight.  Given the couple’s pre-marital relations, 
Davis argued that Leonard had seen all of Alice before being married, and 
that it was crucial for the jury to see the same intimate details of Alice’s body 
that Leonard did before marrying her.  Against objections from Leonard’s 
attorneys, the judge allowed it.  And what transpired was one of the biggest 
race spectacles of the twentieth century.  From the Court record: 
The Court, Mr. Mills, Mr. Davis, Mr. Swinburne, the jury, the plaintiff, 
the defendant, her mother, Mrs. George Jones, and the stenographer left 
the courtroom and entered the jury room.  The defendant and Mrs. 
Jones then withdrew to the lavatory adjoining the jury room and, after a 
short time, again entered the jury room.  The defendant, who was 
weeping, had on her underwear and a long coat.  At Mr. Davis’ direction 
she let down her coat, so that the upper portion of her body, as far down 
as the breast, was exposed.  She then, again at Mr.Davis’ direction, 
covered the upper part of her body and showed to the jury her bare legs, 
up as far as her knees.  The Court, counsel, the jury and the plaintiff then 
re-entered the court room.7 
This dramatic revealing of Alice’s body to the jury composed of all White 
married men was stunning, especially for 1920s sensibilities.  Once back in 
the courtroom, Davis asked Leonard, “Your wife’s body is the same shade as 
it was when you saw her in the Marie Antoinette [hotel] with all of her 
clothing removed?”  Leonard responded affirmatively, to which Davis said 
“That is all.”8 
Shortly after this display of Alice’s body to the jury and Leonard’s 
acknowledgement, the jury returned with a verdict in favor of Alice, finding 
that there was no fraud.  To put a finer point on this:  an all White male jury 
 
 6 Id. at 2416 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). 
 7 Id. at 2429. 
 8 Id. 
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in 1925 ruled against a wealthy White male socialite and in favor of a 
working class Black woman because her race was found to be so visually 
obvious that there could have been no deception.  The jury found that 
Alice’s body, and race in general, visually spoke for itself.  Alice did not have 
to take the stand at any point during the trial.  Her body, and the jury’s 
ability to observe it, was all of the evidence that was needed. 
*  *  * 
This Article argues that the idea that race visually speaks for itself—a 
notion that I call “race” ipsa loquitur9—is not something that is marginally 
relevant to law, or an idea that occasionally arises in cases such as Rhinelander 
v. Rhinelander.  Rather, this notion that race is visually obvious and that its 
salience—in terms of its conspicuousness and striking nature—stems from 
self-evident visual distinctions fundamentally orients law’s most robust 
mechanism for governing race and racial discrimination:  equal protection.  
This jurisprudence has come to embrace a “race” ipsa loquitur sensibility that 
shapes the Court’s approach to race and discrimination in at least three 
regards:  (1) its scrutiny inquiry to determine the standard of review (strict 
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis) to apply to certain groups’ 
claims of discrimination; (2) using colorblindness as a framework to 
conceptualize equal protection’s normative boundaries; and (3) the intent 
doctrine, which requires a demonstration of discriminatory purpose or 
malice to sustain equal protection claims.  In each instance, an implied 
theory of race that is common among lay conceptualizations also orients the 
Court’s approach:  that the salience of race turns on and/or can be reduced 
to its visual obviousness, and that this salience is self-evident in a manner 
that is exogenous to any broader social or legal practice.  It simply is, and is 
known by merely looking.  By framing the salience of race as an ocular 
phenomenon and disaggregating it from any social context or structural 
notion of racial hierarchy, modern equal protection jurisprudence has 
produced a sociologically thin understanding of race that reduces it to a 
series of discrete, visually obvious physical traits whose striking nature and 
conspicuousness are thought to emanate from mere observation. 
 
 9 Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin term often used in tort law meaning “the thing speaks for itself.”  
I use the term “race” ipsa loquitur to suggest that equal protection jurisprudence uses a 
similar concept to understand race as a visually obvious trait that is salient outside of any 
broader social or legal processes.  Similarly, it simply “speaks for itself.”  Others have used 
this phrase in different contexts.  See generally Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur:  Of 
Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 
(1994); Stephen Wolf, Note, Race Ipsa:  Vote Dilution, Racial Gerrymandering, and the 
Presumption of Racial Discrimination, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 225 (1997). 
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In this Article, I make a critical departure against the grain of this trend 
within equal protection jurisprudence by arguing that this influential—
indeed, largely unquestioned—theory of race fundamentally misconstrues 
how race becomes salient, which deeply warps important aspects of this 
jurisprudence.  I argue that the visual salience of race is not obvious or a self-
evident observation that occurs anterior to any other social process.  Rather, 
I contend that the very ability to see race is a social phenomenon:  social 
practices produce the salience that allows us to discern racial differences in 
particular ways.  This is the constitutive theory of race identified by this 
Article.  The visual salience of race—why it is striking, how people are able 
to apprehend group difference—has little to do with individuals’ visual 
capacities or certain traits’ inherently striking nature.  Rather, the salience 
and ability to see these differences is produced by social interactions. 
My approach is theoretically informed by art history literature that 
examines how our visual experiences are not neutral engagements with the 
world, but are rather produced by social relations and forces.10  These 
scholars argue that what we see, how we see, and the very ability to see 
certain things—particularly race—are structured by social contexts that 
shape the way we pay attention to some things and not others.  Art historian 
Martin Berger notes: 
Despite the human propensity to privilege sight, and the long-standing 
Western tendency to root racial designations in observable traits, images 
do not persuade us to internalize racial values embedded within them, so 
much as they confirm meanings for which the discourses and structures 
of our society have predisposed us.  Instead of selling us on racial systems 
we do not already own, the visual field powerfully confirms previously 
internalized beliefs.11 
I draw upon this literature to argue that the visual salience of race—why 
it is noticeable, why it stands out—has little to do with individuals’ visual 
capacities or certain traits’ inherently striking nature.  Rather, this salience is 
produced by social interactions.  I empirically demonstrate the socially 
productive rather than self-evident nature of this visual salience through an 
innovative research question that asks:  how do blind people understand 
race? 
It is largely assumed that individuals without vision have a diminished 
understanding of race.  This assumption is inextricably tied to the “race” ipsa 
 
 10 See, e.g., JONATHAN CRARY, SUSPENSIONS OF PERCEPTION:  ATTENTION, SPECTACLE, AND 
MODERN CULTURE (1999); JONATHAN CRARY, TECHNIQUES OF THE OBSERVER:  ON VISION 
AND MODERNITY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1992); RACE-ING ART HISTORY:  CRITICAL 
READINGS IN RACE AND ART HISTORY (Kymberly N. Pinder ed. 2002); SEEING HIGH & LOW:  
REPRESENTING SOCIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN VISUAL CULTURE (Patricia Johnson ed. 
2006). 
 11 MARTIN A. BERGER, SIGHT UNSEEN:  WHITENESS AND AMERICAN VISUAL CULTURE 1 (2005). 
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loquitur trope embedded in law and society; the inability to see the self-
evident nature of race is thought to preclude any robust appreciation of its 
salience.  But as a way to critique the dominant assumptions about race and 
vision in lay perspectives and doctrinal conversations, I engage in qualitative 
research with blind respondents concerning their understanding of and 
experiences with race.  The findings from this research are both important 
and counterintuitive:  not only do blind people have an understanding of 
race that is no less meaningful or substantive than sighted individuals’, but 
they also understand it visually, i.e., in terms of facial features, skin 
complexion, and other visual attributes typically associated with race. 
The doctrinal implications of this research are significant.  These 
findings empirically destabilize the “race” ipsa loquitur theory of race at the 
heart of equal protection jurisprudence, which provides intellectual and 
doctrinal space to rethink the parameters of inclusion and exclusion for 
higher forms of scrutiny, colorblindness as a normative framework for the 
scope of equal protection, and modern fixations on intent as the touchstone 
for demonstrating the discriminatory nature of facially neutral laws.  It is 
important to clearly articulate that the claim being made is not one of cause 
and effect; I do not assert that the scrutiny inquiry, colorblindness, or the 
intent requirement exist the way that they do primarily because of what I 
have identified as “race” ipsa loquitur.  Each of these jurisprudential 
developments have a distinct genealogy better explained by various social, 
legal, and historical developments.  Rather, I identify a conceptual trend 
within equal protection doctrine linked to lay understandings of race that 
highlights a common emphasis on visibility across these three areas that may 
warp important aspects of the jurisprudence.  In each of these three realms, 
the assumption that the social and interpersonal salience of race turns upon 
self-evident visual differences is a central (yet at times hidden) organizing 
principle that gives coherence to the jurisprudence, both in their individual 
parts and as a whole.  Therefore, the critical role of this Article’s empirical 
contribution is that qualitative data on blind people’s visual understanding 
of race disrupts this centrality of visibility, which may allow for a normative 
reconceptualization of equal protection in a manner that takes seriously the 
social practices that produce the salience of race to encourage a more 
equitable and inclusive jurisprudence.  Put differently, this may be one 
instance where the blind can lead the blind; qualitative data on the life 
experiences of those without the ability to see might give insight to a legal 
system that privileges vision in a manner that blinds it to the social practices 
that produce the visual salience of race. 
It is also important to mark this Article’s conceptual boundaries.  The 
purpose here is not to revisit the idea that race has multiple influences such 
as language, culture, and ancestry.  Nor is its purpose to rearticulate the now 
common claim that race is a social construction, or that the meanings that we 
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attach to various human bodies do not stem from natural or inherent group 
differences, but rather grow out of broader social and political dynamics.  
Race scholarship in law, the social sciences, and the humanities have already 
eloquently and persuasively made these points.12  Instead, this Article tries to 
critique a core aspect of race ideology that transcends almost all race 
scholarship and is embedded in equal protection jurisprudence:  that 
“seeing race”—related to, yet apart from, any social construction that 
attaches meanings to bodies—is an unmediated visual experience whose 
salience is simply self-evident on its own terms.  This paves the way for a 
constitutive understanding of race that, related to constructionist projects, 
draws attention to how social practices produce our ability to see society in 
particular ways.  The qualitative portion of this Article provides empirical 
evidence that gives life to this critique.  Although the salience of race is ex-
perienced as something that is visually obvious within the sighted communi-
ty, blind respondents’ experiences highlight the extent to which this sali-
ence is constituted by various social practices.  As such, this Article 
challenges the dominant lay and legal viewpoints that vision is a prerequisite 
for having a complete understanding of race.  These findings empirically 
destabilize equal protection’s “race” ipsa loquitur trope and raise important 
questions about its current role in the administration of this jurisprudence. 
This Article is divided into five parts.  Part II provides an overview of the 
“race” ipsa loquitur trope in equal protection doctrine and scholarship, paying 
particular attention to its manifestations in the scrutiny inquiry, 
colorblindness, and the intent doctrine.  Part III then describes the 
methodology and findings from the qualitative data collected through over 
100 interviews with blind individuals about their understandings of and 
experiences with race.  This Part provides robust qualitative data supporting 
my key argument:  that the “race” ipsa loquitur trope embedded in equal 
protection law mischaracterizes the visual salience of race as an ocular rather 
than social phenomenon.  The visually striking nature of race is produced by 
social practices rather than self-evidently observed.  Part IV discusses these 
empirical findings’ significance for three areas of equal protection 
jurisprudence—the scrutiny inquiry, colorblindness, and the intent 
doctrine—to offer preliminary thoughts on how equal protection might be 
reimagined along lines that are sensitive to the socially productive rather 
than self-evident conceptions of racial salience.  I conclude in Part V with a 
brief discussion of why it is important for equal protection jurisprudence to 
work from theories of race that are empirically robust.  I then suggest, as a 
 
 12 See, e.g., IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW:  THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (10th ed. 
2006); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:  
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (2d ed. 1994); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993). 
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normative matter, that equal protection rid itself of “race” ipsa loquitur and 
re-orient its theory of race around the social practices giving rise to the 
visibility of race.  This can re-introduce the important roles of social context 
and racial hierarchy in equal protection deliberations, which can lead to a 
more equitable and just jurisprudence. 
II.  RACE IN EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AND SCHOLARSHIP 
A.  Context Giving Rise to Equal Protection’s “Race” Ipsa Loquitur Trope 
Several areas of law have played a key role in defining race and shaping 
race relations, such as slave law,13 anti-miscegenation law,14 and 
naturalization law.15  Nevertheless, equal protection has played an important 
part in governing race in the United States, and is worthy of special 
attention in understanding how specific aspects of American jurisprudence 
have been shaped by the presumption that the salience of race stems 
primarily from self-evidently known visual cues. 
Although the most significant shifts in equal protection law did not 
occur until the 1950s, subtle changes in how law approached its duty to 
 
 13 Legal historian Lawrence Friedman notes in his classic work, A History of American Law, 
that:   
The most visible American pariah, before the Civil War, was the Negro slave.  As 
we have seen, an indigenous system of law grew up to govern the “peculiar 
institution” of slavery.  What was at first a law for the servant class developed 
deeper and deeper overtones of color.  The slave laws then became laws about the 
fate of a race. 
  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 192 (1973).  See also ROBERT M. 
COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED:  ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975); KENNETH M. 
STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION:  SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (1956); 
Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex:  An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 221 (1999); Wilbert E. Moore, Slave Law and Social Structure, 26 J. NEGRO HIST. 171 
(1941); Mark Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery, 1810–1860:  A Study in the Persistence of 
Legal Autonomy, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 119 (1975). 
 14 Rachel Moran notes “antimiscegenation laws have played an integral role in defining 
racial identity and enforcing racial hierarchy. . . . For both blacks and Asians, segregation 
in sex, marriage, and family was a hallmark of intense racialization and entrenched 
inequality.”  RACHEL MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND 
ROMANCE 17–18 (2003).  See also RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES:  SEX, 
MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION (2003); SEX, LOVE, RACE:  CROSSING BOUNDARIES IN 
NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY (Martha Hodes ed. 1999). 
 15 Ian Haney López draws a direct link between the United States’ racial make-up and its 
naturalization laws:  “The racial composition of the U.S. citizenry reflects in part the 
accident of world migration patterns.  More than this, however, it reflects the conscious 
design of U.S. immigration and naturalization laws.”  LÓPEZ, supra note 13, at 27.  See also, 
Mae M. Ngai, Legacies of Exclusion:  Illegal Chinese Immigration during The Cold War Years, 18 
J. AMERICAN ETHNIC HIST. 3 (1998); Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien:  
Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921–1965, 21 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 69 (2003). 
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minorities began in the late 1930s with United States v. Carolene Products.  The 
case is less significant for its holding (the Court upheld a federal statute 
forbidding the shipment of filled milk in interstate commerce) than it is for 
its fourth footnote.  Justice Stone lays the foundation for modern equal 
protection conversations by writing that there might be a stricter standard of 
review for laws “directed at particular religious or national or racial 
minorities . . . [since] prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a 
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”16 
Called “the most celebrated footnote in constitutional law,”17 it has 
spurred a lengthy and influential discussion within the legal academy.  
However, Footnote Four brought focus to a new question that the Court did 
not fully engage until almost twenty years later in Brown:  how failed political 
processes can disproportionately affect racial minorities due to irrational 
prejudice that unconstitutionally bars them from majoritarian lawmaking.18  
This draws attention to the importance of defending liberties that are 
essential to the proper functioning of a democratic political process, which 
recognizes the procedural challenges to democratic self-governance.  
Moreover, the Court’s role is not simply to give scrutiny to possible 
restrictions on the political process in general, but specifically those 
restrictions on the political process that hamper minorities’ ability to protect 
their interests through this very process.  This new form of scrutiny was not 
to apply to any and all minorities; a key aspect of democratic self-governance 
is that some minorities who fail to gain majoritarian popularity must 
inevitably experience defeat.  Rather, Footnote Four suggests special 
solicitude for minorities that are discrete and insular. 
 
 16 United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (emphasis added). 
 17 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1982). 
 18 Footnote Four sets a new agenda to protect minorities who are unable to protect 
themselves due to a failed political process.  The footnote states, in full, that: 
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of 
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which 
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.  It 
is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political 
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable 
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general 
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of 
legislation. . . . Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the 
review of statutes directed at particular religious . . . or national . . . or racial 
minorities . . . whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a 
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call 
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 
  Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (internal citations omitted). 
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But what does this mean?  Louis Lusky, law clerk to Justice Stone at the 
time Carolene Products was decided and largely credited as the author of 
Footnote Four, has written: 
As a matter of language, “discrete” means separate or distinct and 
“insular” means isolated or detached.  The words do not describe aliens 
as such; many of them, who are anglophones, pass unnoticed, and many if 
not most others fit into the social scene with little difficulty. . . . In my 
opinion, the phrase “discrete and insular” applies to groups that are not 
embraced within the bond of community kinship but are held at arm’s 
length by the group or groups that possess dominant political and 
economic power. . . .  Justice Stone, I believe, would have agreed.19 
What stands out in this passage is Lusky’s common sense application of 
the terms “discrete” and “insular.”  To Lusky (and by inference Justice Stone 
and the Carolene Court), “discrete” largely means those who cannot pass by 
unnoticed, and “insular” means those who keep to themselves due to 
political or economic marginalization.  The grammatical structure of the 
phrase—”discrete” as the primary descriptor further refined by “insular” 
with the conjunction “and”—suggests, as does Lusky’s explanation, that the 
Carolene Court was targeting those groups whose insularity stemmed from 
their discreteness.  This puts the inability to pass unnoticed—a nod towards 
visibility—at the heart of the influential Footnote Four. 
B.  “Race” Ipsa Loquitur and Its Doctrinal Manifestations 
Equal protection’s post-Carolene transition to having a heightened 
concern for minority groups’ experiences has led the “race” ipsa loquitur 
trope to, over time, become embedded in the resulting jurisprudence in at 
least three different ways:  (1) the doctrinal considerations for which groups 
are eligible for higher forms of judicial scrutiny; (2) the Court’s normative 
claims concerning colorblindness as a guidepost for reading and applying 
the Equal Protection Clause; and (3) the requirement that discriminatory 
intent—not merely disparate impact—must be demonstrated to sustain 
claims that a facially neutral law or practice violates equal protection.  This 
section will consider each of these in turn. 
1.  Equal Protection’s Scrutiny Inquiry 
Just prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 
Footnote Four’s underlying sentiment—that stronger judicial oversight 
should be provided for minority groups—made its first appearance in the 
main body of a Supreme Court opinion in Korematsu v. United States, which 
 
 19 Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux:  A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 
1105 n.72 (1982) (emphasis added). 
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concerned the constitutionality of Japanese internment during World War 
II.20  This first articulation of what has become known as strict scrutiny 
nonetheless led the Court to uphold the executive order leading to the 
internment of Japanese Americans.21  Korematsu established the now familiar 
constitutional architecture where courts deploy strict scrutiny—where a law 
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest—to 
laws implicating race, national origin, and alienage, while most other equal 
protection challenges (except those implicating sex, gender, or children 
born to parents that are not married, which receive intermediate scrutiny) 
are merely afforded rational basis review:  courts will uphold their 
constitutionality as long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate 
purpose. 
While equal protection’s doctrinal development has been robust since 
Korematsu and Brown, not enough thought has been given to understanding 
precisely how courts understand race in fulfilling their constitutional duty to 
use judicial review to protect the rights of these groups.  Moreover, there is 
even less coherency in the Court’s jurisprudence on the principles that 
justify treating racial discrimination differently from other forms of group-
based subordination.  This is important since equal protection 
jurisprudence dictates that a plaintiff’s group membership shapes the level 
of review used to determine whether the state’s categorization is permissible.  
The Court has extended stricter forms of scrutiny beyond mere rational 
 
 20 The Korematsu Court wrote “all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single 
racial group are immediately suspect. . . . [C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid 
scrutiny.”  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 21 Justice Black concludes the majority opinion upholding Japanese internment by stating: 
It is said that we are dealing here with the case of imprisonment of a citizen in a 
concentration camp solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry 
concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United States.  Our task 
would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving the imprisonment of a 
loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice.  Regardless of 
the true nature of the assembly and relocation centers—and we deem it 
unjustifiable to call them concentration camps with all the ugly connotations that 
term implies—we are dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion order.  To 
cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real 
military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue.  Korematsu was 
not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race.  He 
was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the 
properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and 
felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the 
military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be 
segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, 
reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders—as inevitably it 
must—determined that they should have the power to do just this.  There was 
evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that 
the need for action was great, and time was short.  We cannot—by availing 
ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these 
actions were unjustified. 
  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223–24 (emphasis omitted). 
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basis review to classifications “based on race, sex, national origin, alienage, 
and illegitimacy . . . [without] provid[ing] a clear overarching rationale for 
why these five classifications, and not others, are particularly deserving of 
judicial solicitude.”22  Rather, the Court takes three factors (not 
requirements) into consideration:  whether the person bringing a claim is 
part of a group that (1) has historically been subjected to discrimination; (2) 
is a politically powerless minority; and (3) “exhibit[s] obvious, immutable, or 
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group.”23 
What appears first as a rather parsimonious three-prong test is actually 
the product of several divergent jurisprudential threads coalescing around 
modern equal protection commitments.  The first prong’s concern with a 
group’s history of discrimination stems from the Court’s post-Brown 
commitments to affirmatively use judicial review to go beyond Plessy’s formal 
equality to engage in a more pragmatic understanding of how the social 
histories intertwined with legally-enforced discriminations can lead to 
apartheid.  The second prong’s concern for protecting politically powerless 
groups is an offshoot of the second paragraph in Footnote Four.  The Court 
discusses the relevance of these first two prongs in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez, which concerns the constitutionality of funding 
schools through tax bases that systemically favored the wealthy.24  The Court 
held that the appellees residing in underfunded areas did not constitute a 
suspect class that could elicit a strict scrutiny analysis since they constituted 
“a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of 
residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other 
districts.”25  As such, the Court declined to exert its highest form of review 
typically reserved for claims of racial discrimination since: 
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of 
the traditional indicia of suspectness:  the class is not saddled with such 
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to 
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process.26 
 
 22 Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection:  The Visibility Presumption and the Case 
of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 489 (1998) (citing Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2441 (1994)) [hereinafter Yoshino, 
Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection]. 
 23 Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (citing Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 
(1986)). 
 24 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 25 Id. at 28. 
 26 Id. 
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The third prong’s emphasis on obvious, immutable,27 or distinguishing 
characteristics provides the most direct articulation of how groups deemed 
visually distinct are granted the highest form of protection.  Yet there is 
doctrinal evidence that this prong’s emphasis on granting groups with 
visually distinguishable markers higher protections orients how the Court 
thinks about the other two prongs.  For example, in Mathews v. Lucas, the 
Court said that while law often treats children born to parents that are not 
married differently than those born in traditional families, “this 
discrimination against illegitimates has never approached the severity or 
pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discrimination against 
women and Negroes . . . perhaps in part because illegitimacy does not carry 
an obvious badge, as race or sex do.”28  Moreover, in Frontiero v. Richardson, 
the plurality extended strict scrutiny (later revised to intermediate scrutiny 
in Craig v. Boren) to sex-based discrimination based, in part, on a theory of 
political powerlessness linked to the visibility of women’s sex difference:  “it 
can hardly be doubted that, in part because of the high visibility of the sex 
characteristic, women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, 
discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job market and, 
perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena.”29  Therefore, the third 
prong’s bluntness can be largely seen as a constitutive element of the other 
two prongs in terms of how visibility orients the way the Court understands 
the severity of groups’ political powerlessness and history of discrimination.  
It can be argued that the visibility component was always already a 
prerequisite for  higher judicial scrutiny, but only became articulated as a 
“prong” as a way to justify extending heightened scrutiny to sex-based 
classifications.  That is, the doctrinal justification for treating sex-based 
classifications more like race classifications in Frontiero is that sex 
discrimination, like race discrimination, orients around visible physical 
differences that trigger prejudices that require stronger constitutional 
protections to mitigate.  Thus, the explicit articulation of a visibility prong 
post-Frontiero without any deeper theoretical or structural consideration of 
what race is and how it becomes salient can be reasonably seen as restating 
what was up to then part of the obvious in equal protection:  that the theory 
 
 27 I emphasize the importance of visibility over immutability since critiques of the latter 
have been exhaustive and the Court has effectively subsumed immutability under 
visibility.  As such, immutability will only be discussed to the extent that it is an implicit 
part of the visibility prong.  See generally Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 1375 (1999).  See also Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection, supra 
note 23, at 498–99. 
 28 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976).  See also Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal 
Protection, supra note 23, at 496–98. 
 29 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).  See also Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in 
Equal Protection, supra note 23, at 496–98. 
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of race embedded in this jurisprudence is one that treats phenotype and 
other human markers as visually obvious and self-evident triggers of 
antagonistic social relations.30  The implication is that these markers’ 
visibility and salience exist anterior to law and society rather than produced by 
social and legal relations.  That is, “race” ipsa loquitur:  race, and its salience, 
simply speak for themselves. 
2.  The Coherence of Colorblindness 
“Race” ipsa loquitur is a significant part of equal protection jurisprudence 
beyond serving as a gateway concept that arbitrates the level of scrutiny 
afforded to various groups’ claims of discrimination.  It also shapes the 
Court’s normative vision for the appropriate role of government in using 
racial categories.  This increasingly dominant perspective, known as 
colorblindness, reflects a legal ideology of racial non-recognition; equal 
protection is conceived as substantially limiting the State’s ability to take race 
into consideration when allocating resources or benefits, even when done to 
remedy ongoing disadvantages linked to past harms.31  To put a finer point 
on it, colorblindness yields “an anticlassification understanding of the Equal 
Protection Clause that accords race-conscious remedies and racial 
subjugation the same level of constitutional hostility.”32 
While some have argued that contemporary colorblindness reflects a 
good faith application of its intellectual antecedents,33 scholars have 
 
 30 Yoshino attributes the birth of the visibility and immutability factors to: 
[A]n attempt to isolate the commonalities between the paradigm groups of race 
and sex in the early 1970s. . . . Rather than operating from a priori principles, the 
equal protection jurisprudence has been driven by the groups asking for 
protection.  Generally, the inquiry has not been, “What principles define groups 
that are worthy of judicial protection?” but rather, “Is group X in or 
out?” . . . Under this group-driven analysis, new groups are admitted by showing 
that they are like groups that have already established their claim to protection. 
  Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection, supra note 23, at 559. 
 31 See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16 
(1991) (“Advocates of the color-blind model argue that nonrecognition by government is 
a decision-making technique that is clearly superior to any race-conscious process.  
Indeed, nonrecognition advocates apparently find the political and moral superiority of 
this technique so self-evident that they think little or no justification is necessary.”). 
 32 Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”:  Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 
59 STAN L. REV. 985, 988 (2007) [hereinafter López, “A Nation of Minorities”]. 
 33 See generally ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992).  Contemporary 
articulations of colorblindness have at least two intellectual origins.  John Marshall 
Harlan gave the idea its first public articulation in his dissenting opinion in Plessy v. 
Ferguson.  In Plessy, Harlan famously broke from the majority, declaring, “[o]ur 
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”  
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).  As a second intellectual influence, 
advocates of colorblindness often point to Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “March on 
Washington Address” in 1963, where he famously remarked “I have a dream that my four 
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persuasively traced the birth of modern colorblindness to the unique racial 
politics of the post-Civil Rights Era that generated a backlash against efforts 
to use law and public policy to atone for the racial apartheid stemming from 
centuries of racial subordination.34  This reaction has given rise to what Lani 
Guinier and Gerald Torres call the “colorblind universe”—a general theory 
of race and discrimination that has informed the Court’s understanding of 
its commitment to racial equality in general and, more specifically, the 
normative boundaries of equal protection remedies.  Guinier and Torres 
argue that this ideology is governed by three different claims about race.  
First, rather than being a complex matrix of power relations, social status, 
and historical relationships, “race is all about skin color . . . [or] a false 
construction of phenotype that relies improperly on ascriptive physical 
identifiers of ‘blood’ or ancestry.”35  That is, colorblindness frames race as a 
series of superficial visual cues that mark human difference—skin color, 
facial features, etc.—without attributing any inherent meaning to them.  
This gives race and discrimination a theoretical symmetry that belies any 
sensitivity to the existence of racial hierarchy.36  Second, colorblindness 
frames race consciousness as the equivalent of being racist.  This is an odd 
twist on the social constructionist perspective on race.  While social 
constructionism and colorblindness share a perspective that race does not 
reflect inherent meanings, colorblindness advocates racial equality by 
encouraging the state to abandon such categories while social 
constructionists typically encourage race consciousness in order to 
ameliorate the social conditions that perpetuate inequality.  From the 
colorblind perspective, “when one notices race, one is implicitly manifesting 
 
little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of 
their skin but by the content of their character.” Martin Luther King, Jr., The March on 
Washington Address (Aug. 28, 1963), in GREAT AMERICAN SPEECHES 239, 242 (Gregory R. 
Suriano ed., 1993). 
 34 The writings of Nathan Glazer and Patrick Moynihan, along with scholarship from the 
legal academy, challenged the wisdom of affirmative action as public policy during this 
period while also reconceptualizing the sociology of racial inequality as a phenomenon 
linked to personal or group failures rather than racial hierarchy.  See generally López, “A 
Nation of Minorities,” supra note 33.  Eduardo Bonilla-Silva similarly argues that 
colorblindness “became the dominant racial ideology as the mechanisms and practices 
for keeping blacks and other racial minorities ‘at the bottom of the well’ 
changed . . . [wheareas] contemporary racial inequality is reproduced though ‘new 
racism’ practices that are subtle, institutional, and apparently nonracial.”  EDUARDO 
BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS:  COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF 
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 2–3 (2006). 
 35 LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY:  ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING 
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 38 (2002). 
 36 Id. (“When race is only pigmentation, all racial classifications are equally bad, despite 
hierarchies of privilege or disadvantage that accompany the racial assignation.”). 
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racial enmity or racial preference,”37 which poses “blindness”  to race or non-
recognition as the only appropriate role for government.  Lastly, 
colorblindness frames racism as a problem that bad individuals have rather 
than a system of hierarchy that all individuals participate in.  Guinier and 
Torres note that from this perspective, “racism lacks any necessary nexus to 
power or privilege, and any observed connection is incidental, merely a 
result of the actions of people with a bad heart.”38 
Colorblindness has been an influential aspect of modern equal 
protection jurisprudence since Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 
where an unsuccessful White applicant to the University of California, Davis 
School of Medicine (“UC Davis”) sued the University for excluding him 
from consideration for one of the sixteen seats reserved for minority 
applicants.  In Bakke, two sets of four Justices each argued for and against an 
anti-classification approach to the government’s use of race.  This judicial 
fragmentation led to the rather narrow holding that UC Davis’s admissions 
program was unlawful but that race may continue to be a consideration.  
One of the most significant parts of this case was Justice Powell’s opinion, 
which sowed the seeds for constitutional colorblindness by concluding that 
strict scrutiny applied to all racial categorizations, regardless of whether the 
person is a member of a “discrete and insular minority.”  Powell’s 
declaration that “[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently 
suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination”39 stripped 
the affirmative action debate of the very context that gives legitimacy to such 
programs.  Therefore, “[i]n advocating the same standard in all cases, 
Powell effectively argued that for constitutional purposes, preferential 
treatment and Jim Crow laws amounted to the same thing—the central 
claim of reactionary colorblindness.”40  This central claim is premised upon 
a particular understanding of race:  that it is a superficial, “skin deep,” and 
merely descriptive characteristic that is inherently dubious for government 
consideration—regardless of whether such consideration is done to 
entrench existing racial privilege or remedy past subordination.  Race is 
sociologically and theoretically flat; it is thought to only describe an 
individual’s physical traits or group membership rather than confer any 
benefits or burdens.  The lack of conceptual depth accorded to 
understanding precisely what race is and how it impacts individuals’ lives 
leads to a reductionist understanding that draws heavily upon common 
sense perspectives that (1) as a mere descriptive category, the salience of 
race stems from its visually obvious character and that (2) blindness or non-
 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 39. 
 39 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978). 
 40 López, “A Nation of Minorities,” supra note 33, at 1034. 
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recognition, in terms of an inability or unwillingness to see race, necessarily 
leads to racial equality.41 
Powell’s language has had a resounding effect on equal protection 
jurisprudence beyond Bakke’s holding that race can continue to have limited 
consideration in university admissions.  Powell did not side with the Justices 
in Bakke that explicitly advocated colorblindness through forgoing 
constitutional deliberations and instead argued that Title VI prevented such 
race-conscious university admissions.  But Powell’s opinion greased the 
wheels for subsequent successful claims of constitutional colorblindness, where 
the Fourteenth Amendment itself was read to bar race-conscious decision 
making.  This was first fully developed in Richmond v. Croson, which entailed 
a program that gave preferences for municipal contracts to minority-owned 
businesses in Richmond, Virginia.  Drawing upon many of the same 
sentiments articulated by Justice Powell in Bakke, the Court held this scheme 
to violate the Equal Protection Clause—but through using a jurisprudential 
lens of colorblindness.  There is an important link between Powell’s dicta in 
Bakke and O’Connor’s reasoning in Croson: 
Like Powell, O’Connor used the version of ethnicity picturing whites as 
black to mandate strict scrutiny.  Then, just as Powell did, in considering 
whether structural disadvantage justified affirmative action, O’Connor 
reverted to the version of ethnicity depicting all groups as the masters of 
their own destiny, none suffering particular disadvantage. . . . Croson 
posited a veritable tug of war between various identically situated ethnic 
groups competing for the spoils of government largess.  O’Connor 
 
 41 Powell argues: 
Petitioner urges us to adopt for the first time a more restrictive view of the Equal 
Protection Clause and hold that discrimination against members of the white 
“majority” cannot be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as “benign.”  The 
clock of our liberties, however, cannot be turned back to 1868.  It is far too late to 
argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits the 
recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that 
accorded others.  The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely against 
discrimination due to a “two-class theory”—that is, based upon differences 
between “white” and Negro. 
Once the artificial line of a “two-class theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment is put 
aside, the difficulties entailed in varying the level of judicial review according to a 
perceived “preferred” status of a particular racial or ethnic minority are 
intractable.  The concepts of “majority” and “minority” necessarily reflect 
temporary arrangements and political judgments. . . . [T]he white “majority” itself 
is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of 
prior discrimination at the hands of the State and private individuals.  Not all of 
these groups can receive preferential treatment and corresponding judicial 
tolerance of distinctions drawn in terms of race and nationality, for then the only 
“majority” left would be a new minority of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants.  There is 
no principled basis for deciding which groups would merit “heightened judicial 
solicitude” and which would not. . . . The kind of variable sociological and political 
analysis necessary to produce such rankings simply does not lie within the judicial 
competence—even if they otherwise were politically feasible and socially desirable. 
  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294–97. 
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wrapped her opinion in the moral legitimacy afforded by the “dream of a 
Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant.”  But by 
drawing blacks as white, she in effect reasoned as if this end state even 
now existed:  race was ostensibly already irrelevant to the life chances of 
minorities in America.  In this context, not only was affirmative action 
unnecessary, but it threatened the American racial paradise by 
victimizing whites, making them the new minority.  In its first 
instantiation as Equal Protection law, colorblindness drew heavily on the 
redescription of race constitutionally pioneered by Powell in Bakke, 
positing whites as black to justify heightened review, but blacks as white 
to deny the persistence of racial hierarchy and the necessity of racial 
reconstruction.42 
Conceptualizing Blacks and Whites as equally advantaged and 
disadvantaged groups is key to legitimizing colorblindness and its 
jurisprudence of non-recognition as an appropriate norm for applying equal 
protection principles.  Moreover, it draws attention to the “race” ipsa loquitur 
sensibility bubbling underneath colorblindness.  Depicting race as a series of 
conflicting ethnic groups elides the existence of racial hierarchy and makes 
racial conflict appear episodic rather then entrenched.  But the superficial 
rendering of race that this vision of equal protection is based upon is one 
that is thoroughly imbued by the lay presumption that race is a visually 
obvious and trivial characteristic that only “marks” group membership and 
cannot—indeed, should not—be used to acknowledge and resolve 
inequality linked to persistent forms of racial subordination.  We see this 
clearly in a recent episode of constitutional colorblindness in Parents Involved 
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.  There, the Court struck 
down two different public school district schemes that used race as a factor 
to assign students to particular schools to diversify learning environments.43  
The Court was critical of the notion of diversity pursued by each district,44 
 
 42 López, “A Nation of Minorities,” supra note 33, at 1050–51. 
 43 The Court noted that: 
The school districts in these cases voluntarily adopted student assignment plans 
that rely upon race to determine which public schools certain children may 
attend.  The Seattle school district classifies children as white or nonwhite; the 
Jefferson County school district as black or “other.”  In Seattle, this racial 
classification is used to allocate slots in oversubscribed high schools.  In Jefferson 
County, it is used to make certain elementary school assignments and to rule on 
transfer requests.  In each case, the school district relies upon an individual 
student’s race in assigning that student to a particular school, so that the racial 
balance at the school falls within a predetermined range based on the racial 
composition of the school district as a whole. 
  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709–10 (2007). 
 44 The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence acknowledges diversity as a compelling 
government interest that permits the usage of racial categories.  However, the Court 
notes in Parents Involved that: 
The plans here are not tailored to acheiving a degree of diversity necessary to 
realize the asserted educational benefits; instead the plans are tailored . . . to “the 
goal established by the school board of attaining a level of diversity within the 
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holding that the plans violated equal protection.  In closing his majority 
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts endorses colorblindness with remarkable 
flair:  “Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could 
not go to school based on the color of their skin. . . . The way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of 
race.”45  Government efforts to use race-as-color as a mechanism to entrench 
Jim Crow segregation is morally and constitutionally equated with 
government efforts to diversify racially homogenous school districts, where 
blindness—rearticulated by Justice Roberts as “stop discriminating on the 
basis of race”—is the primary means through which the racial utopia of 
“stop[ped] discrimination” is thought to be achieved. 
But what makes this colorblind worldview—in particular, a colorblind 
understanding of equal protection’s normative boundaries—seem so self-
evidently coherent that Brown and Parents Involved can be read as companion 
cases separated by a mere five decades when they actually address 
fundamentally different questions of state-enforced racial subordination and 
government use of race for remedial purposes?  While the post-Civil Rights 
social and political contexts are absolutely essential to understanding the 
rise of colorblindness,46 existing scholarship has largely ignored the 
cognitive influence of colorblindness as a metaphor in shaping the social, 
legal, and political coherence of this approach.  Equal protection scholars 
have mostly limited the metaphorical significance of colorblindness to mere 
rhetorical flourish; colorful language that cleverly characterizes a particular 
ideology.  For example, Reva Siegel writes that “[t]he rhetoric of colorblind 
constitutionalism is but another mode of talking about race, invoking the 
social fact of racial stratification in the course of denying its normative 
significance.”47  From this perspective, Siegel limits the colorblind metaphor 
to doing specific linguistic work in smoothing over otherwise inconsistent 
 
schools that approximates the district’s overall demographics.”  The districts offer 
no evidence that the level of racal diversity necessary to achieve the asserted 
educational benefits happens to coincide with the racial demographics of the 
respective school districts—or rather the white/nonwhite or black/“other” 
balance of the districts, since that is the only diversity addressed by the plans.  
Indeed, in its brief Seattle simply assumes that the educational benefits track the 
racial breakdown of the district. . . . 
This working backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than 
working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides 
the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing precedent. 
  Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 727, 729. 
 45 Id. at 747–48. 
 46 See generally López, “A Nation of Minorities,” supra note 33 (reviewing historical evolution of 
the demand of colorblindness); Julie Novkov, Toward a Legal Genealogy of Color Blindness, 
MIDWEST POL. SCI. ASS’N, 2007, available at http://works.bepress.com/julie_novkov/3. 
 47 Reva B. Siegel, The Racial Rhetorics of Colorblind Constitutionalism:  The Case of Hopwood v. 
Texas, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION:  AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 29, 30 (Robert Post & Michael 
Rogin eds., 1998) [hereinafter Siegel, The Racial Rhetorics of Colorblind Constitutionalism]. 
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understandings of race.48  Thus, in explaining the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
Hopwood v. Texas, holding that the University of Texas cannot use race in law 
school admissions, Siegel largely frames the metaphorical significance of 
colorblindness as a function of its rhetorical ability to allow conflicting ideas 
of race to rest comfortably together in a manner that maintains racial 
subordination under seemingly neutral terms.49  In another article, Siegel 
notes that “colorblindness discourse functions as a semantic code 
[that] . . . can be used to characterize practices in ways that may either 
disrupt or rationalize social stratification [in a manner that] . . . may offer 
symbolic or expressive testimony of this society’s desire to achieve neutrality in 
matter of race relations.”50 
But this understanding of metaphors—where its significance is seen 
primarily as rhetorical—is inconsistent with contemporary research on 
metaphors’ cognitive impacts.  Metaphors are traditionally conceived as 
being matters of figurative language, where a figure of speech is used to 
convey an idea rather than expressing it literally.  From this perspective, 
metaphors as literary devices allow individuals to understand abstract, 
intangible things or experiences in terms of concrete and known entities.  
For example, the phrase “time is money” allows us to understand time, as an 
 
 48 Siegel notes: 
[S]ince Reconstruction, white Americans have frequently coupled talk of 
colorblindness with racial privacy rhetoric that seeks to protect relations of racial 
status from government interference.  As this historical analysis reveals, current 
affirmative action law does not rest solely on values of colorblindness or racial 
“nonrecognition”; it also draws on a normative discourse about the racial private 
sphere, a domain of racial differences that the state may not disturb.  If we read 
the contradictory racial rhetorics structuring affirmative action jurisprudence in 
light of this historical tradition, it is easier to understand their underlying 
preoccupations and considerable persuasive power. 
  Id. at 31. 
 49 For example, Siegel argues that: 
[T]he diversity and remedial holdings of the Hopwood opinion are premised on 
two conflicting and irreconcilable conceptions of race, and so expose 
contradictions in the larger body of equal protection jurisprudence on which the 
case draws.  Quoting liberally from the Supreme Court’s recent opinions, the Fifth 
Circuit invokes both “thin” and “thick” conceptions of race.  Sometimes the 
Hopwood opinion insists that race is but a morphological accident, a matter of skin 
color, no more.  At other times, Hopwood discusses race as a substantive social 
phenomenon, marking off real cultural differences amongst groups.  These 
conceptual inconsistencies are not incidental to the opinion, but instead arise out 
of the conflicting justifications the Supreme Court has offered for imposing 
constitutional restrictions on race-conscious regulation.  Invoking these 
contradictory conceptions of race, Hopwood construes the Constitution to restrict 
government from regulating on the basis of race and construes the Constitution to 
protect the existing racial order. 
  Id. at 30–31. 
 50 Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law:  How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts 
and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 78 (2000) (emphasis added) 
[hereinafter Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law]. 
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intangible and amorphous entity, in terms of the rather tangible value 
society places on monetary currency.51  This traditional understanding is 
consistent with how legal scholars have framed the metaphorical significance 
of colorblindness.  Yet, limiting the significance of metaphor to mere 
rhetoric is becoming increasingly disfavored; research is beginning to show 
how metaphors have a much deeper impact on cognition in filtering how 
individuals understand and interpret the social and political world around 
them.  Cognitive scientists are now arguing that “the locus of metaphor is 
thought, not language[;] metaphor is a major and indispensible part of our 
ordinary conventional way of conceptualizing the world, and that our 
everyday behavior reflects our metaphorical understanding of experience.”52  To the 
extent that “[t]he essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing 
one kind of thing in terms of another,”53 metaphors are central to human 
cognition rather than periphery speech acts.  Metaphors’ commonsensical 
salience—such as an old joke or a stable economy—come from their ability 
to leverage fundamental aspects of human cognition that enable us to 
experience intangible concepts through tangible ones, giving abstract 
concepts materiality.  This transfer of materiality then comes to orient much 
of how we understand and experience intangibilities in the social world, 
from boiling anger to sunny happiness. 
Thus, metaphors shape human perception of social reality at a deeply 
cognitive rather than merely textual level.  They filter how information is 
processed and understood, and thus how reality subjectively appears.  
Metaphors play upon the underlying architecture of our cognitive systems to 
give cohesive force to individuals’ ability to experience abstract concepts in 
terms of known tangible entities in a manner that organizes entire thought 
patterns.54  Thus, metaphors allow us to seamlessly project one area of 
experiential knowledge that is directly perceptible to other areas that are 
merely conceptual or theoretical so as to give them substance.55  In short, 
 
 51 GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 7–9 (1980). 
 52 GEORGE LAKOFF, THE CONTEMPORARY THEORY OF METAPHOR, METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 
(Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed 1992) (emphasis added). 
 53 LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 52, at 5 (emphasis omitted). 
 54 See generally, Diana Ponterotto, The cohesive role of cognitive metaphor in discourse and 
Ccnversation, in METAPHOR AND METONYMY AT THE CROSSROADS:  A COGNITIVE 
PERSPECTIVE (Antonio Barcelona ed., 2000) (summarizing a shift in focus of research 
studies on metaphors from strictly linguistic to cognitive). 
 55 As David Allbritton notes: 
Metaphor has been shown to serve a number of important cognitive functions, 
including that of making new conceptual domains accessible through 
metaphorical “scaffolds” imported from better known domains, such as in the case 
of metaphors in science, and providing a coherent framework or schema for 
understanding such everyday topics as time, arguments, and emotions.  In 
addition, schemas derived from conceptual metaphors are capable of forming 
connections between elements within a text representation, suggesting that 
 
728 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:3 
 
metaphors allow certain ideas about the world to become thinkable.  Neuroscientific 
studies56 are beginning to show how certain aspects of our brains’ structure 
and cognitive functioning allow metaphors to shape the way we think about 
the world to make certain concepts thinkable57 in a much more constitutive 
fashion than what is represented in legal scholarship.  For example, Lera 
Boroditsky and her colleagues have examined how different metaphorical 
systems regarding crime can lead people to have fundamentally different 
ways of thinking about solving social issues.58  Their experiment involved 
exposing participants to descriptions of otherwise neutral crime reports that 
were embedded with language either describing crime as a predator 
(stalking victims, hiding in shadows) or as a virus (an infection that spreads, 
risk factors that lead to disease, a containable problem).59  They found that 
 
metaphor may play an important role in text comprehension.  The most 
interesting things that we learn about metaphor may turn out to be not the 
mechanisms through which metaphors are understood but, rather, the things that 
metaphor allows us to do. 
  David W. Allbritton, When Metaphors Function As Schemas:  Some Cognitive Effects of Conceptual 
Metaphors, 10 METAPHOR & SYMBOLIC ACTIVITY 33, 43 (1995). 
 56 See generally Lera Boroditsky et al., Sex, Syntax, and Semantics, in LANGUAGE IN MIND:  
ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE & THOUGHT 61 (Dedre Gentner & Susan Goldin-
Meadow eds., 2003) (noting the way thought may be shaped by language); Ponterotto, 
supra note 55, (noting the central role of metaphor in discourse); Gwenda L. Schmidt et 
al., Beyond Laterality:  A Critical Assessment of Research on the Neural Basis of Metaphor, 16 J. 
INT’L NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL SOC’Y 1 (2010) (noting the pervasive and unique use of 
metaphors in human communication); Catherine Mackenzie et al., The communication 
effects of right brain damage on the very old and the not so old, 12 J. NEUROLINGUISTICS 79 
(1999) (noting the inabilities to comprehend metaphor in research into brain damage); 
Hiram H. Brownell et al., Appreciation of Metaphoric Alternative Word Meanings By Left and 
Right Brain-Damaged Patients, 28 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 375 (1990) (same); Heath A. 
Demaree et al., Brain Lateralization of Emotional Processing:  Historical Roots and a Future of 
Incorporating “Dominance”, 4 BEHAV. & COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE REVIEWS 3 (2005) 
(reviewing research on the interrelation between brain damage and lexical emotion). 
 57 Allbritton, supra note 56. 
 58 See, e.g., Paul H. Thibodeau & Lera Boroditsky, Metaphors We Think With:  The Role of 
Metaphor in Reasoning, 6 PLOS ONE, Feb. 2011, at 1 (investigating the role metaphor plays 
in social reasoning); Paul Thibodeau et al., When a bad metaphor may not be a victimless 
crime:  The role of metaphor in social policy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY 809 (Niels Taatgen & Hedderik van Rijn 
eds., 2009) (same). 
 59 The researchers noted that: 
The experiment was designed to explore whether simply embedding a common 
metaphor in an otherwise neutral report about crime can systematically influence 
people’s approach to solving the crime problem.  In the task, participants read a 
report about crime in a fictional city and then answered questions about the city.  
The report contained mostly crime-relevant statistics, and also two brief instances 
of either the crime as predator metaphor or the crime as virus metaphor.  After 
reading the report, participants answered questions relating to crime in the city.  
Critically, in one of these questions, participants were asked to propose a solution 
to the crime problem.  If metaphors in fact have psychological weight, then being 
exposed to different metaphors for crime may lead people to propose different 
solutions to the city’s crime problem.  For example, people exposed to the crime 
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“[w]hen crime was compared to a virus, participants were more likely to 
suggest reforming the social environment of the infected community.  When 
crime was compared to a predator, participants were more likely to suggest 
attacking the problem head on—hiring more police officers and building 
jails.”60  The authors also note that these experimental results: 
[S]uggest that metaphors can influence how people conceptualize and in 
turn hope to solve important social issues.  It appears that even casually 
encountering one metaphor or another in discourse about crime can 
lead people to unwittingly propose different types of solutions for the 
crime problem.  Importantly, it appears that the metaphors had a 
subconscious effect on people’s reasoning.  Very few of our participants 
thought that the metaphors influenced their crime-reducing 
suggestion.61 
This is rather remarkable experimental evidence of how metaphors 
matter in shaping policy preferences and notions of justice rather than 
merely reflecting otherwise established preferences through a coat of 
superficial rhetoric. 
In short, metaphors orient and organize the very ways in which we 
perceive and think about the world.  The significance of metaphors is not 
simply about rhetorical flourish, but rather making certain abstract ideas 
about the world thinkable by experiencing them through more tangible 
concepts.  Therefore, to limit the metaphorical significance of 
colorblindness to being rhetorical polish or to see its role as simply 
obscuring the inconsistencies between various perspectives on race is to not 
fully appreciate the constitutive role metaphors play in orienting normative 
conceptions pertaining to the social and legal world.  For example, Siegel 
argues that “one needs a concept of social stratification—of status inequality 
among groups arising out of the interaction of social structure and social 
meaning—in order to make sense of the blindness trope at the heart of 
antidiscrimination law.”62  This is undoubtedly true.  Yet, the converse is 
equally important:  we need to think seriously about how colorblindness 
operates as a metaphor to make sense of how it becomes a coherent 
perspective from which to understand social structure.  The colorblind 
metaphor facilitates a much deeper cognitive ordering beyond mere 
 
as a predator metaphor might propose toughening law enforcement, while people 
exposed to the crime as disease metaphor might think about dealing with 
problems in the community and improving the social environment to prevent 
future crime.  Of course, it is also possible that such metaphors are simply 
ornamental flourishes of language, and do not influence how people conceive of 
important social issues like crime. 
  Thibodeau et al., supra note 59, at 810. 
 60 Id. at 814. 
 61 Id. at 811. 
 62 Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law, supra note 51, at 77–78. 
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rhetoric that makes certain normative ideas about social relations seem 
natural and unproblematic.  Therefore, to fully understand and critique this 
worldview, the metaphor itself must be taken seriously rather than 
continuing in the fashion of most equal protection scholarship where the 
colorblind metaphor is treated as superficial language.  A more modern and 
empirically-grounded understanding of the role of metaphors in orienting 
social and political worldviews suggests that we should pay more attention to 
its constitutive role in making colorblindness seem like a coherent ideology. 
Taking the colorblind metaphor seriously in relation to the 
jurisprudence it elicits means, as a first step, examining the claims put forth 
by the term itself to understand the cognitive effect it may have on how 
individuals experience the world.  Recall that the cognitive impacts of 
metaphors work by allowing individuals to understand and experience 
intangible concepts (such as time) through those that are seemingly 
tangible (such as money), allowing them to transfer the emotive and 
cognitive experience of the latter onto the former:  time is money.  
Colorblindness, as a metaphor, suggests:  (a) that race is largely about color 
or visually obvious differences; (b) that blindness, in terms of not being able 
to see or distinguish between racial groups, prevents one from 
understanding racial differences in any meaningful way and therefore leads 
to a diminished understanding of race that reflects true equality; and (c) 
that society can partake in this racial paradise through legal and political 
means that mimic this experience of blindness through a jurisprudence of 
racial non-recognition.  (While the social experience of being blind—i.e., 
not having any vision—is not the same as the experience of being 
colorblind—i.e., not being able to properly distinguish colors—the two 
concepts, in this context, share an overall framing that not being able to 
visually recognize or distinguish between racial groups fosters racial 
equality.)  In short, the colorblind metaphor gains its coherence from a 
particular assumption about race—that it is primarily a visual experience of 
engaging with self-evident markers of human difference.  This metaphor is 
further motivated by a particular assumption regarding the way race plays 
out among people with diminished visual capabilities—that it is irrelevant—
to make a normative assertion about how the state ought to approach race, 
treating non-recognition as a predicate for achieving a racial utopia that 
justifies this move in the doctrinal hermeneutics of equal protection.  For 
example, Bakke and Richmond turn on eliminating discourses of privilege and 
advantage from Whiteness and reframing Whites as a composition of 
competing groups whose social experiences are not unlike any other racial 
minority; sometimes they win in jockeying for political power, sometimes 
they lose.  But what makes this “move” possible is a particular theoretical 
approach that at once limits race to its most superficial characteristics—
visual cues—that makes the metaphor of blindness through a jurisprudence 
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of non-recognition coherent.  The embedded “race” ipsa loquitur trope plays 
an important cognitive role in allowing race to be conceptualized this way. 
To be sure, paying closer attention to colorblindness as a metaphor is 
not to say that the social and political transformations in the post Civil 
Rights Era are unimportant, nor is it to suggest that the literal phraseology 
of colorblindness caused them.  Rather, it is to suggest that contemporary 
conversations on colorblindness have not taken the metaphor seriously in 
terms of the “work” that it does at a cognitive level in giving coherence to 
this worldview.  We can perhaps better understand the self-evident 
coherence that colorblindness has assumed in equal protection analysis after 
Richmond v. Croson63 as the product of an iterative process between 
metaphors’ cognitive impact and the aforementioned shifting social and 
political contexts that, taken together, (re)create a theory of race that 
prioritizes its visual significance en route to a broader jurisprudence of non-
recognition.  This approach suggests that sufficient attention has not been 
given to fleshing out and critiquing the theory of race that colorblindness 
operates from and reproduces:  “race” ipsa loquitur. 
3.  The Intent Doctrine 
The intent doctrine is traditionally understood as emerging from the 
Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in Washington v. Davis to require a 
demonstration of discriminatory purpose or “bad intent” to sustain claims 
that a facially neutral law or practice violates equal protection.64  This 
doctrine has made it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to maintain claims of 
discrimination; demonstration of disparate impact is not sufficient in and of 
itself, and direct evidence of individual decisionmakers’ specific intent to 
produce bad outcomes is rare except in the most extraordinary cases. 
Yet, this traditional genealogy has recently come under scrutiny for 
offering an incomplete understanding of the role of intent analyses in equal 
protection race jurisprudence.  Moreover, this standard narrative of the 
intent doctrine springing out of Washington v. Davis may obscure the critical 
role of colorblindness in giving rise to its current incarnation as requiring a 
specific demonstration of ‘bad intent.’65  Ian Haney López argues that what 
is missing from the conventional story about the intent doctrine’s origins is 
that the judicial examination of intent existed before Washington v. Davis, 
but in a different form where social context was used to infer inappropriate 
 
 63 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 64 See generally Ian Haney López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 
2012) (manuscript at 3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920418 [hereinafter 
López, Intentional Blindness] (challenging the notion of a divided equal protection). 
 65 For a persuasive reconsideration of the intent doctrine’s genealogy, see id. 
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motives rather than requiring direct evidence of malice.66  Davis itself drew 
attention to this contextual approach to discerning intent.  The Davis Court 
found that there was no discrimination in the administration of Test 21 as 
an examination for promotion within Washington D.C.’s police department 
and held that government action is not unconstitutional “solely because it has 
a racially disproportionate impact.”67  Yet, context still mattered for the Davis 
Court in inferring whether or not an unconstitutional purpose existed.68  
Thus, the Court “did not just extol [this] contextual [method for inferring] 
intent, [it] employed it, albeit to find no discrimination.”69 
From this standpoint, Davis did not usher in a jurisprudence fixated on 
individual malice.  This turn towards malice has been shown to be a post-
Bakke development in equal protection analysis.  Recall that Powell’s opinion 
in Bakke encouraged deemphasizing context in affirmative action cases in a 
manner that subjects all uses of race—remedial or discriminatory—to strict 
scrutiny and promoted an ethos of non-recognition.70  While this position 
was not signed onto by the other Justices in Bakke, it has become a 
formidable influence in equal protection analysis—particularly in 
transforming intent doctrine.71  The year following Bakke, the Court in 
 
 66 López notes: 
Returning to the civil rights era, the Court stayed true to this balance between 
investigating general motives while eschewing a concern for individual intentions.  
It repeatedly drew inferences about governmental purposes from the larger 
context, while avoiding direct inquiries into individual mindsets.  Sometimes this 
inferential process reflected little more than judicial notice of race relations. . . .  
At other times, the Justices relied on a more focused examination of surrounding 
racial patterns, including through the invocation of social science.  Perhaps the 
quintessential example is Brown itself, in its famous footnote 12.  Whatever the 
combination of judicial notice and focused study, the point is that the Court did 
not demand direct proof of subjective mindsets.  Instead, findings of 
discriminatory purpose reflected inferences drawn from the challenged action as 
well as the surrounding context—in a phrase popular with the Court, from the 
“totality of the circumstances.” 
  Id. at 18–19 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 67 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (emphasis in original). 
 68 “Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality 
of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one 
race than another . . . . Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole 
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.” Id. at 
242. 
 69 López, Intentional Blindness, supra note 65 at 29.  Justice White wrote in Davis: 
Even agreeing with the District Court that the differential racial effect of Test 21 
called for further inquiry, we think the District Court correctly held that the 
affirmative efforts of the Metropolitan Police Department to recruit black officers, 
the changing racial composition of the recruit classes and of the force in general, 
and the relationship of the test to the training program negated any inference that 
the Department discriminated on the basis of race or that “a police officer 
qualifies on the color of his skin rather than ability.” 
  Davis, 426 U.S. at 246 (internal citations omitted). 
 70 See infra Part IIB.2. 
 71 See generally López, Intentional Blindness, supra note 65. 
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Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney relied heavily upon Powell’s 
colorblind logic to assert—in a case that was actually about gender 
discrimination—that “a racial classification, regardless of purported 
motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an 
extraordinary justification.”72  Feeney shifted the constitutional problem to 
that of classification itself; the context that mattered so much up through 
and past Davis was now reduced to an immediately suspect act of 
government classifying or “seeing” individuals’ ostensibly superficial traits, 
where the Court asserted that “[r]ace is the paradigm.”73  But Feeney also 
reconfigured the meaning of discriminatory purpose or intent:   
Discriminatory purpose . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent 
as awareness of consequences. It implies that the 
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at 
least in part “because of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects upon 
an identifiable group. 74 
This has led several commentators to conclude that Feeney initiated a 
doctrinal requirement of demonstrating “bad intent” to sustain claims that 
equal protection has been violated.75  But what has been underappreciated 
until recently is the extent to which the shift in equal protection analysis 
from contextual inquiries to an acontextual emphasis on categorization and 
malice stems from the Court embracing colorblindness; framing the equal 
protection problem as one of classification or merely “seeing” race is to 
embrace and extend blindness as an interpretive model.  Thus, the intent 
doctrine as we currently know it is conceptually linked to colorblindness;76 its 
current iteration and emphasis on malice is fruit from the poisonous 
colorblind tree.  What occurs is an increasingly decontextualized 
understanding of race and racism that moves them from being understood 
through contextual interactions between human difference and social 
structure to a reductionist emphasis on physical traits—the Feeney Court’s 
“adverse effects upon an identifiable group”—whereby categorization in bad 
faith is privileged yet race itself remains undertheorized and conceptually 
flattened to something that is presumptively self-evident or obvious.  Put 
differently, in disaggregating race from context or social structure, the Court 
effectively embraces “race” ipsa loquitur as its theory of race.  Race needs no 
contextual explanation or investigation.  It simply speaks for itself. 
 
 72 Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
 73 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272. 
 74 Id. at 279 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 75 See e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects:  The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1135 (1997) [hereinafter Siegel, Why Equal 
Protection No Longer Protects]. 
 76 See López, Intentional Blindness, supra note 65. 
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Taken together, this Part’s main doctrinal point is that the Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence has evolved in a manner where race is conceptually 
reduced to a series of discrete, self-evidently “identifiable” categories that are 
salient on their own terms that are known by mere visual observation.  What 
happens across all three areas—the scrutiny inquiry, colorblindness, and the 
intent doctrine—is the development of a reductionist account of race that 
promotes a sociologically “thin” understanding of how and why race 
becomes salient.  By removing context, all that is left is mere visual 
difference; categories based on such seemingly self-evident differences 
become the bulk of inquiry rather than the context and social practices that 
make difference visible in the first place.  I challenge this notion that racial 
difference is self-evidently salient or knowable through an empirical model 
that asks “How do blind people understand race?”  By doing this, we can 
empirically explore the accuracy of the “race” ipsa loquitur claim.  The 
empirical inquiry allows for examining how and why social practices become 
key to understanding the salience of race and thus why context must be put 
back into the mix not simply as a matter of justice, but also for the Court to 
work with empirically robust understandings of race.  However, before 
discussing the empirical findings, it is useful to examine how the “race” ipsa 
loquitur understanding of race has also affected equal protection scholarship. 
C.  Scholarly Approaches to Modern Equal Protection Law 
Part IV will discuss some of the existing scholarly critiques pertaining to 
the scrutiny inquiry, colorblindness, and the intent doctrine to situate the 
contribution made by this Article’s empirical critique of the “race” ipsa 
loquitur trope in equal protection law.  This section, however, will take a step 
back to examine how equal protection scholars have broadly conceived of 
race in order to highlight the synergies between equal protection 
scholarship and doctrine:  both embrace “race” ipsa loquitur, or the idea that 
the salience of race stems from its self-evident visual character.  The small set 
of articles examined in this section are by no means representative of the 
vast equal protection literature.  Rather, I briefly look at a limited number of 
influential equal protection articles to broadly sketch how race has been 
traditionally theorized in this literature. 
The modern scholarly conversation surrounding equal protection has 
most famously been an appendage of what Alexander Bickel called the 
countermajoritarian difficulty,77 or the concern created when judicial review 
is used by individuals that are not democratically elected to ostensibly thwart 
 
 77 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (assessing the merits of the Court’s decisions and 
analyzing the role of the Court). 
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the majoritarian will of the governed.78  The countermajoritarian difficulty is 
far from only an equal protection problem; the debates go back to the very 
founding of this country in terms of figuring out the appropriate role of 
unelected judges in a democratic society.  Yet the tension between the 
countermajoritarian difficulty and equal protection has led to scholarship 
that fleshes out how race has been conceptualized among equal protection 
scholars. 
To describe the vast and rich scholarship on the countermajoritarian 
difficulty is beyond this Article’s scope.  But, it is useful to sketch some of the 
key arguments made by influential scholars to use as guideposts to gauge 
how equal protection scholarship has theorized race and discrimination as 
primarily visual phenomena and the impact this has for the underlying 
architecture of the jurisprudence.  Probably the most celebrated post-Bickel 
engagement with issues pertaining to judicial review, equal protection, and 
countermajoritarianism is John Hart Ely’s Democracy and Distrust.  Here, Ely 
riffs off of Footnote Four in Carolene Products to advance a theory of judicial 
review that focuses on process rather than substantive values.  In other 
words, he frames “the court as referee.”79  While Ely provides an eloquent 
discussion of how his process theory of judicial review interacts with the 
challenges posed by equal protection, his engagement with the moral 
imperative driving modern equal protection jurisprudence—that 
discrimination against discrete and insular minorities is particularly 
troublesome—is less than robust.  Ely argues that “only ‘racelike’ 
classifications should be regarded as suspect,”80 without providing a 
complete concept of what race is (outside of equal protection’s historical 
commitment to protecting Blacks) before exploring the traits that make a 
characteristic sufficiently similar.  Put differently, race goes without 
meaningful definition.  As a result, the implication is that Ely draws upon a 
 
 78 Barry Friedman argues that “[t]he ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ [is] the central 
obsession of modern constitutional scholarship.”  Barry Friedman, The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One:  The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
333, 334 (1998) [hereinafter Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty] 
(footnote omitted).  He sums up the concerns surrounding this concept as “the problem 
of justifying the exercise of judicial review by unelected and ostensibly unaccountable 
judges in what we otherwise deem to be a political democracy.”  Barry Friedman, The Birth 
of an Academic Obsession:  The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE 
L.J. 153, 155 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession].  “[T]o the 
extent that democracy entails responsiveness to popular will, how to explain a branch of 
government whose members are unaccountable to the people, yet have the power to 
overturn popular decisions?”  Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 
Part One:  The Road to Judicial Supremacy, supra note 79, at 335 (footnote omitted). 
 79 See generally, JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, 
chapter 4 (1980). 
 80 Id. at 149. 
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lay understanding that race is visually obvious (suggesting that it needs no 
meaningful discussion outside of what is seen) to then theoretically explore 
what makes a potential classification race-like.  Ely sees problems with both 
the traditional “discrete and insular”81 and immutability82 approaches to 
understanding which classifications are suspect.  Rather, Ely argues that we 
should shift our focus to how prejudice “is a lens that distorts reality”83 and 
thus unduly alters the political process in a way that justifies judicial review.  
By this reasoning, prejudice is an exogenous social factor anterior to the 
political process rather than something embedded within; the process itself 
is presumptively pure.  The role of courts through judicial review then is to 
“look not simply to the legislative product here, but to the process that 
generated it, to see whether it can identify some factor or factors that 
suggest the likelihood of such legislative misapprehension.”84 
Bruce Ackerman’s Beyond Carolene Products pursues a close reading of 
Carolene Products (without substantively engaging other cases) to take 
another look at the countermajoritarian difficulty through the lens of equal 
protection.  For Ackerman, the brilliance of Carolene Products is that it 
“reverse[s] the spin of the countermajoritarian difficulty” by showing that 
“the original legislative decision, not the judicial invalidation, suffers the 
greater legitimacy deficit.”85  Nevertheless, Ackerman finds that “a 
reappraisal of Carolene is a pressing necessity [since] its approach to minority 
 
 81 Ely interprets Justice Stone’s use of discrete and insular minorities in footnote four of 
Carolene Products to reference: 
[T]he sort of “pluralist” wheeling and dealing by which the various minorities that 
make up our society typically interact to protect their interests, and constituted an 
attempt to denote those minorities for which such a system of “mutual defense 
pacts” will prove recurrently unavailing.  But even understood thus, a “discrete and 
insular minorities” approach, at least one that refuses to attend to why the minority 
in question is discrete and insular, also turns out to be less than entirely tenable.  
Perhaps the most obvious objection is one it is always easy to make, that courts 
aren’t qualified to engage in this kind of practical political analysis. 
  Id. at 151. 
 82 Ely notes: 
[N]o one has bothered to build the logical bridge, to tell us exactly why we should 
be suspicious of legislatures that classify on the basis of immutable characteristics.  
Surely one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by something that he or she can’t 
do anything about, but I’m not aware of any reason to suppose that elected 
officials are unusually unlikely to share that feeling. 
  Id. at 150.  But see id. at 154–55, where he concedes that: 
The ability to frame the point of a classification harming (or subsidizing) a certain 
group in terms of a desire to discourage people from joining (or encourage 
people to join) that group obviously depends on the mutability of the 
characteristic that forms the basis of classification. . . . Immutability thus cannot be 
the talisman that some have tried to make it, but it isn’t entirely irrelevant 
either. . . . 
 83 Id. at 153. 
 84 Id. at 157. 
 85 Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1985). 
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rights is profoundly shaped by the old politics of exclusion and yields sys-
tematically misleading cues within the new participatory paradigm.”86  Key to 
this argument is Ackerman’s belief that being a member of a discrete and 
insular minority is actually advantageous within a democratic political 
system, suggesting that the moral impetus of Carolene Products is at best 
outdated and at worst theoretically misguided.87 
Although Ackerman recognizes that Blacks are the “paradigmatic 
Carolene group,” he offers neither a theory of race nor a broader 
understanding of why Carolene groups are particularly important outside of 
history and the persistence of prejudice against minorities.  He defines “a 
minority as ‘discrete’ when its members are marked out in ways that make it 
relatively easy for others to identify them.  For instance, there is nothing a 
black woman may plausibly do to hide the fact that she is black or female.”88  
It is from this visual understanding of race that Ackerman argues that Blacks 
are in a strong position to leverage the machinery of pluralist politics to 
their advantage.89  The real focus of judicial review from his perspective 
should be “the anonymous and diffuse victims of poverty and sexual 
discrimination who find it most difficult to protect their fundamental 
interests through effective political organization.”90  Similar to Ely, the 
implied theory driving this perspective is that race is a visually obvious fact; 
 
 86 Id. at 717. 
 87 Ackerman argues: 
Carolene is utterly wrongheaded in its diagnosis.  Other things being equal, 
“discreteness and insularity” will normally be a source of enormous bargaining 
advantage, not disadvantage, for a group engaged in pluralist American politics.  
Except for special cases, the concerns that underlie Carolene should lead judges to 
protect groups that possess the opposite characteristics from the ones Carolene 
emphasizes—groups that are “anonymous and diffuse” rather than “discrete and 
insular.”  It is these groups that both political science and American history 
indicate are systematically disadvantaged in a pluralist democracy. 
  Id. at 723–24. 
 88 Id. at 729 (emphasis added). 
 89 Ackerman notes that: 
[A]s long as we use Carolene rhetoric to express our constitutional concerns with 
racial equality . . . we will find ourselves saying things that are increasingly belied 
by political reality.  While constitutional lawyers decry the political powerlessness 
of discrete and insular groups, representatives of these interests will be wheeling 
and dealing in the ongoing pluralist exchange—winning some battles, losing 
others, but plainly numbering among the organized interests whose electoral 
power must be treated with respect by their bargaining partners and competitors.  
Gradually, this clash between constitutional rhetoric and political reality can have 
only one result.  As time goes by, the constitutional center will not hold:  the 
longer Carolene remains at the core of the constitutional case for judicial review, 
the harder lawyers will find it to convince themselves, let alone others, that judicial 
protection for the rights of “discrete and insular minorities” makes constitutional 
sense. 
  Id. at 745. 
 90 Id. 
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nothing, especially not law, constitutes the ability to see racial difference.  It 
simply is. 
In another law review article that focuses its attention on a close reading 
of Carolene Products, Robert Cover’s The Origins of Judicial Activism in the 
Protection of Minorities provides an insightful discussion of the relationship 
between race, equal protection, and countermajoritarianism.  Yet Cover also 
fails to provide a substantive theory of vision as applied to race to 
understand what it is about discreteness (and to a lesser extent insularity) 
that justifies giving these groups special protections.  Rather than exploring 
the theoretical implications of being a group that visually stands out for 
majoritarianism, the experiences of minorities are used to justify judicial 
review as a check upon apartheid.  Cover frames racism as what is done to a 
group of people whereby race—largely characterized as the visually obvious 
human differences between minority and majority groups—is seen as the 
motivating factor, the so-called trigger for group conflict.  Cover notes: 
Apartheid was not, however, hysteria.  It was the governing system that 
pervaded half the country, and like any such system it was implicitly and 
explicitly supported by the Constitution.  It is clear to me that when 
Stone wrote [F]ootnote [F]our he intended to protect against transitory 
hysteria.  It is not clear to me whether he knew he had also embarked on 
a program to rewrite the Constitution. . . . [W]hether or not the 
[F]ootnote is a wholly coherent theory, it captures the constitutional 
experience of the period from 1954 to 1964.  And that experience, more 
than the logic of any theory, is the validating force in law.91 
Cover’s pragmatic or experience-based view of Carolene Products’ 
influence is certainly convincing; the urgent social contexts of the period 
did not lend themselves to a moment of deep reflection and theoretical 
ruminations.  Rather, people were being slaughtered abroad, and Jim Crow 
was entrenching itself at home.  Discrete and insular minorities, in this 
sense, are what they do.92  Yet the effect is still nonetheless important:  
emphasizing the pragmatic concerns of the debate between race, judicial 
 
 91 Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 
1287, 1316 (1982). 
 92 Cover argues that: 
“[D]iscrete and insular” minorities are not simply losers in the political arena, they 
are perpetual losers.  Indeed, to say that they lose in the majoritarian political 
process is seriously to distort the facts:  they are scapegoats in the real political 
struggles between other groups.  Moreover, in their “insularity” such groups may 
be characteristically helpless, passive victims of the political process.  It is, 
therefore, because of the discreteness and insularity of certain minorities (objects 
of prejudice) that we cannot trust “the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”  A more searching judicial 
scrutiny is thus superimposed upon the structural protections against “factions” 
relied on by the original Constitution—the diffusion of political power and checks 
and balances. 
  Id. at 1296. 
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review, and countermajoritarianism reifies lay renditions of the presumed 
visual obviousness of race as unproblematic.  In the absence of a more 
substantive theory of race, we are left to fall back on its lay significance as the 
obvious visible divisions between humans known by phenotype. 
Another string of relevant scholarship looks descriptively and 
normatively at the underlying theories motivating judicial review of “discrete 
and insular” minorities, skirting the broader issues that make the judicial 
review of certain types of legislative classifications particularly important.  
Paul Brest set out a passionate defense of the antidiscrimination principle in 
a 1977 Harvard Law Review piece, a principle that he describes as 
“disfavor[ing] race-dependent decisions and conduct—at least when they 
selectively disadvantage the members of a minority group.”93  Race-
dependent decisions are those that “would have been different but for the 
race of those benefited or disadvantaged by them . . . including overt racial 
classifications on the face of statutes and covert decisions by officials.”94  This 
principle embraces a mainstream process theory of judicial review that 
supports incremental approaches to resolving discrimination that focus on 
individuals and classifications while being skeptical of reasoning backwards 
from racial groups’ disparate outcomes to infer unconstitutional 
discrimination.  From this perspective, race is only important in as far as it 
affects how individuals treat one another, not group status dynamics.95 
From this antidiscrimination perspective of the engagement of judicial 
review with equal protection doctrine,96 race is merely a trait that individuals 
possess.  Indeed, Brest tautologically defines his usage of race in this essay as 
“a shorthand for race and ethnic origin . . . [reserving the argument that] 
the antidiscrimination principle can be and has been extended to 
encompass a variety of other traits.”97  Thus, the unarticulated theory of race 
 
 93 Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, Foreword:  In Defense of the Antidiscrimination 
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Brest asserts that: 
[T]he fact is that most injuries of discrimination . . . were inflicted on particular 
persons and only they are entitled to compensation.  Where discrimination has 
undermined the unity or culture of a group, it may be appropriate to characterize 
the injury as one to the group; but the appropriate remedy then is one that 
reestablishes the group, an end that is not promoted by the fiction of treating 
individual members as its agents. 
  Id. at 52. 
 96 Brest notes: 
The antidiscrimination principle rests on fundamental moral values that are 
widely shared in our society.  Although the text and legislative history of laws that 
incorporate this principle can inform our understanding of it, the principle itself 
is at least as likely to inform our interpretations of the laws.  This is especially true 
with respect to the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment. 
  Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 97 Id. 
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used here reflects what can be seen across doctrinal and scholarly race 
conversations:  lay understandings of race based primarily on visual cues can 
be unproblematically imported into legal discussions in a manner that 
reifies its presumed visually obvious characteristics. 
Owen Fiss provides an alternative principle to guide judicial review of 
equal protection cases that implicate race:  a group disadvantaging 
principle, also described as anti-subordination.  Fiss offers this approach in 
the context of a philosophical engagement rather than doctrinal discussion98 
as both an alternative to and critique of the mainstream antidiscrimination 
principle that largely reflects the Court’s approach.99  Fiss argues that: 
[T]he antidiscrimination principle embodies a very limited conception 
of equality, one that is highly individualistic and confined to assessing the 
rationality of means . . . [in contrast to an anti-subordination approach, 
which] takes a fuller account of social reality, and . . . more clearly 
focuses the issues that must be decided in equal protection cases.100 
One of Fiss’s central arguments is that “[u]nder the antidiscrimination 
principle, the constitutional flaw inheres in the structure of the statute or 
the conduct of the administrator, not in its impact on any group or class.”101  
This preoccupation with individual transactions and classificatory burdens 
on persons rather than groups bothers Fiss, leading to the development of a 
group disadvantaging principle to guide constitutional thought.  Fiss is 
careful to articulate that “[t]he overarching idea of the antisubordination 
principle is that certain social practices . . . should be condemned not 
 
 98 Fiss published this article in a philosophy journal, not a law review.  Therefore, the 
discussion of case law is scant, with a heavier emphasis on having a more nuanced 
discussion of the underlying theories of antidiscrimination and anti-subordination.  Owen 
M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976). 
 99 Fiss argues that “[a]ntidiscrimination has been the predominant interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.  The examples I have given are cast primarily in terms of race, 
but the principle also controls cases that do not involve race.  It is the general 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”  Fiss, supra note 99, at 118.  But see 
Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:  Anticlassification or 
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003), in which the authors argue that the 
presumed jurisprudential dominance of the antidiscrimination or anticlassification 
approach is not all that clear: 
[W]e challenge the common assumption that . . . the anticlassification principle 
triumphed over the antisubordination principle.  We argue instead that the scope 
of the two principles overlap, that their application shifts over time in response to 
social contestation and social struggle, and that antisubordination values have 
shaped the historical development of anticlassification understandings. 
100 Fiss, supra note 99, at 108. 
101 Id. at 127.  Fiss continues on to say: 
Any individual who happens to be burdened by a statute or practice, or any 
individual excluded from the benefits, can complain of the wrong. . . . But, the 
individual’s entitlement to relief is not dependent on the interests or desires of 
others similarly subject to or excluded from the statute or practice. 
  Id. 
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because of any unfairness in the transaction attributable to the poor fit 
between means and ends, but rather because such practices create or 
perpetuate the subordination of the group of which the individual excluded 
or rejected is a member.”102 
While Fiss provides a more theoretically compelling understanding103 of 
how judicial review should approach racial discrimination and its group 
impact, his theory of race is similar to those he criticizes.  Race as a social and 
legal concept deserves no special theoretical attention outside of lay 
understandings that it reflects human differences known primarily through 
observing phenotypical variation and visual observation.  Indeed, Fiss notes 
that: 
[T]here are natural classes, or social groups, in American society and 
blacks are such a group.  Blacks are viewed as a group; they view 
themselves as a group; their identity is in large part determined by 
membership in the group; their social status is linked to the status of the 
group; and much of our action, institutional and personal, is based on 
these perspectives.104 
This understanding of natural classes does not explicitly articulate a 
visual understanding of race.  However, in the absence of specifying a theory 
of race, Fiss’s argument presumptively works from lay understandings of race 
that take visual distinctions as a common sense boundary between racial 
groups.  It goes without saying only because it is a deeply ingrained belief in 
our society.  What Fiss sees as “natural classes”—human divisions that exist 
apart from any social influences—speaks to an unarticulated theory of how 
he primarily knows these divisions or what makes them salient:  visual cues.  
This is not to conflate natural understandings of race with visual ones or wed 
them too strongly.  Rather, it is to point out their relationship and how 
visual understandings of race are often implied without an explicit 
articulation.  Such “race” ipsa loquitur approaches where race speaks for itself 
are not uncommon in equal protection discussions; in many ways, they 
reflect the norm.  It is a shared assumption across equal protection doctrine 
 
102 Owen Fiss, Another Equality, 2 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 3–4 (2004). 
103 Fiss’s group disadvantaging principle as a way to rethink equal protection is strongly 
grounded in Blacks’ social reality: 
The conception of blacks as a social group is only the first step in constructing a 
mediating principle.  We must also realize they are a very special type of social 
group.  They have two other characteristics as a group that are critical in 
understanding the function and reach of the Equal Protection Clause.  One is that 
blacks are very badly off, probably our worst-off class (in terms of material well-
being second only to the American Indians), and in addition they have occupied 
the lowest rung for several centuries.  In a sense, they are America’s perpetual 
underclass.  It is both of these characteristics—the relative position of the group 
and the duration of the position—that make efforts to improve the status of the 
group defensible. 
  Fiss, supra note 93, at 150. 
104 Id. at 148 (emphasis added). 
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and most scholarly conversations that race reflects a series of discrete 
categories of human difference that are external to legal processes and are 
known simply by looking out into the world. 
Other scholars have presented additional guiding principles for the 
judicial review of equal protection cases implicating race—all with the 
undertone of how to effectively manage countermajoritarian concerns.  Cass 
Sunstein presents an anticaste principle—somewhat similar to Fiss’s group 
disadvantaging principle—that “forbids social and legal practices from 
translating highly visible and morally irrelevant differences into systemic 
social disadvantage, unless there is a very good reason for society to do so.”105  
Taking race as his paradigmatic example, Sunstein does not provide further 
theoretical elucidation on his conception of race and its relevance to this 
anticaste principle other than to say “a special problem of inequality arises 
when members of a group suffer from a range of disadvantages because of a 
group-based characteristic that is both visible for all to see and irrelevant from 
a moral point of view.”106  This approach to race, which frames its legal 
significance in the visual cues that trigger certain discriminatory responses 
that are unconstitutional, is par for the course with regards to scholarly and 
doctrinal conversations on race and equal protection.  Race and 
discrimination are seen as problems inhering in bodies that, when visually 
observed, can spark discriminatory responses.  For example, Sunstein argues 
that: 
Because the stigmatizing characteristic is highly visible, it will probably 
trigger reactions from others in a wide variety of spheres, even in the 
interstices of everyday life.  Highly visible characteristics are especially 
likely to be a basis for statistical discrimination and to fuel prejudice from 
third parties. . . . It is for this reason that the argument I am making 
works best when the morally irrelevant characteristic is highly visible.  
When the characteristic is not highly visible, we cannot have a caste 
system as I understand it here, though the translation into disadvantage 
 
105 Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2412 (1994) (emphasis 
added).  Sunstein further describes this principle: 
This principle grows out of the original rejection of the monarchical legacy and 
the explicit constitutional ban on titles of nobility.  The principle was fueled by the 
Civil War Amendments and the New Deal.  The opposition should be understood 
as an effort to eliminate, in places large and small, the caste system rooted in race 
and gender.  A law is therefore objectionable on grounds of equality if it 
contributes to such a caste system.  The controlling principle is that no group may 
be made into second-class citizens.  Instead of asking “Are blacks or women 
similarly situated to whites or men, and if so have they been treated differently?” 
we should ask “Does the law or practice in question contribute to the maintenance 
of second-class citizenship, or lower-caste status, for blacks or women?” 
  Id. at 2428–29 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
106 Id. at 2411–12 (emphasis added). 
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of a morally irrelevant but invisible characteristic can raise important 
equality concerns as well.107 
This analysis highlights how much of the conversation around judicial 
review’s approach to race and equal protection not only embraces a lay 
theory of race largely defined by visual cues, but works from a concept where 
the moral justification for stronger forms of judicial solicitude largely depends 
upon the notion that race is what we see.  If any one component has come to 
structure how courts define race and understand their moral and legal 
obligations to remedy racial discrimination, it is the visual aspect of race 
(skin color, hair texture, facial features, etc.), if only because the conception 
of race in law reflects that of society. 
Other scholars—notably critical race theorists—have critiqued this 
mainstream conversation concerning race and equal protection law and 
have given race a complexity and thoughtfulness that is often missing within 
the equal protection orthodoxy.  Critical race theory’s (“CRT”) main 
contribution has been to challenge mainstream legal narratives that frame 
race and racism as aberrational social experiences and to highlight the ways 
that racial subordination is central to law.  Part of this approach includes 
examining the previously widespread notion that race reflects natural or 
biological differences between groups by demonstrating how social and legal 
forces construct racial meanings.  In this vein, this scholarship has shed light 
on law’s role in constructing race and racial meanings and, moreover, how 
the failure to take this perspective seriously can further entrench inequality.  
Neil Gotanda’s A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind” exemplifies this 
scholarship.  Gotanda unpacks colorblindness as an ideology perpetrated by 
the Court to reveal four distinct meanings:  status race (race representing 
status in society), formal race (socially constructed formal categories, such as 
“Black” and “White”), historical race (subordinating relationship between 
races, both past and present), and culture race (race as culture, community, 
and consciousness).108  Gotanda notes that “American racial classifications 
follow two formal rules:  1) Rule of recognition:  any person whose Black-
African ancestry is visible is Black [and] 2) Rule of descent.”109  Gotanda does 
not provide an extended critique of this first rule (which reflects this 
project’s “race” ipsa loquitur thesis), but does highlight the difficulty of 
finding explicit articulations (doctrinal, scholarly, or otherwise) where he 
discusses the significance of visual cues to discussions of race and law: 
One way to begin a critique of the American system of racial classification 
is to ask “Who is Black?”  This question rarely provokes analysis; its 
answer is seen as so self-evident that challenges are novel and noteworthy.  
 
107 Id. at 2432–33. 
108 See generally Gotanda, supra note 32. 
109 Id. at 24 (emphasis altered). 
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Americans no longer have need of a system of judicial screening to 
decide a person’s race; the rules are simply absorbed without explicit 
articulation.110 
Yet, like much scholarship in this area, there are no further thoughts on 
how race becomes visually salient. 
D.  Theory of Race Emanating from Equal Protection Doctrine and 
Scholarship 
The review of the doctrinal development of equal protection law and its 
surrounding scholarship suggests an important yet largely unarticulated 
trend.  In relation to the inordinate attention paid to thinking through the 
difficulties and appropriate relationship between equal protection and 
judicial review, race has been conceptually reduced to its lowest common 
denominator:  a set of discrete and visually obvious categories primarily 
known by phenotype and other visual cues.  Thus, an important theory of 
race embedded throughout equal protection jurisprudence is that race 
speaks for itself; race is what you see, and what you see is salient and striking for 
self-evident reasons.  “Seeing” race is understood as a fact of life that is 
exogenous to any broader social, legal, or political process.  Moreover, this 
exogenous variable is thought to be the trigger giving rise to equal 
protection conversations. 
By saying that equal protection doctrine and mainstream scholarship 
have a reductionist theory of race, I do not mean to simply reassert that race 
is socially or legally constructed, a point that has already been eloquently 
made.111  Instead, I want to extend this conversation by questioning the 
extent to which visual distinctions between racial groups are thought to be 
self-evident boundaries of difference.  Law’s focus on visibility might 
privilege a certain way of thinking about race that historically has been 
intertwined with racial subordination, i.e., that racial differences are real, 
tangible, and obvious rather than a product of social practices.  Thus, the 
“race” ipsa loquitur trope in equal protection doctrine may very well limit 
discussions of what race is and, more importantly, might obscure the most 
effective way to use racial categorizations in a thoughtful, non-discriminatory 
manner.  Given these stakes, an empirical examination might provide 
insight into the relationship between race and vision, drawing attention to 
 
110 Id. at 23–24. 
111 See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race:  Some Observations on Illusion, 
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994) [hereinafter López, The Social 
Construction of Race:  Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice]; LAURA E. GÓMEZ, 
MANIFEST DESTINIES:  THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN RACE (2007); Aliya 
Saperstein & Andrew M. Penner, The Race of a Criminal Record:  How Incarceration Colors 
Racial Perceptions, 57 SOC. PROBS. 92 (2010). 
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the extent that visual understandings of race may not arise out of their 
obviousness but from constitutive social practices that create their salience.  
The results from this empirical research that flesh out this concept are 
discussed in Part III. 
III.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS112 
A.  Research Design 
The purpose of this research is to determine whether the theory of race 
embedded in equal protection doctrine is empirically defensible:  that the 
salience of race, and the legally cognizable trigger for discriminatory 
behavior, stems from its self-evident visual significance.  Put differently, is 
race salient on the terms articulated by the Court, i.e., because it is visually 
obvious?  Or does this visual understanding of race (and the discriminatory 
behavior that equal protection sees as tightly connected with it) emanate 
from something else, which might suggest that the Court’s understanding of 
the salience of race with regards to the scrutiny inquiry, colorblindness, and 
the intent doctrine is inherently flawed?  To test whether the visual salience 
of race comes from its purported obviousness, we can use qualitative 
methods to examine the experiences of those without vision or the ability to 
visually distinguish between racial groups:  people who are totally blind, and 
have been so since birth.  Focusing on this population (as opposed to 
including those who are partially sighted or lost their vision later in life) is 
conceptually important; it allows for a particular understanding of whether 
the absence of vision affects individuals’ perceptions of race.  Individuals 
with partial sight can sometimes see certain physical traits while those who 
lose their sight as a child, adolescent, or adult may have residual visual 
memories of race that may confound the research results.  Talking to people 
who have never been capable of seeing the physical attributes associated 
with race and comparing these experiences to those of sighted people offers 
the best way to examine whether there are influences beyond the presumed 
self-evident character of race that lead it to be primarily understood in visual 
terms.  This aspect of the methodological design is key:  since blind and sighted 
individuals live in similar social contexts, the environment or social practices 
 
112 The dataset presented in this section differs significantly from the dataset presented in a 
previous article.  Here, I have substantially expanded the number of blind and sighted 
respondents to offer findings that draw upon a richer set of data.  This Article is also 
distinguished in that I discuss and apply the findings from this expanded dataset to a 
specific constitutional discussion regarding the “race” ipsa loquitur idea embedded in equal 
protection jurisprudence and scholarship.  See generally Osagie K. Obasogie, Do Blind 
People See Race?  Social, Legal, and Theoretical Considerations, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 585 
(2010). 
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can be held constant so as to empirically test the relevance of the main 
variable—vision—in relation to the visual salience of race. 
For this Article, interviews with sighted individuals help empirically 
ground the motivating hypothesis—that sighted people primarily think 
visually about race—in order to draw similarities to the experiences of the 
main group under study, i.e., blind individuals.  This comparison, and the 
use of sighted people in particular, allows this Article to unearth thoroughly 
unexamined and unchallenged assumptions throughout society that are 
reflected in equal protection law:  that race is uniquely salient because of 
visual distinctions, that this visual significance is self-evident and exogenous 
to social forces, and that race therefore has diminished or even no 
importance for blind people. 
I conducted 161 interviews with blind respondents,113 with 106 qualifying 
as totally blind since birth.114  The fifty-five non-qualifying interviews with 
people who had some sight or lost their vision as a child, adolescent, or 
adult were not included in the results.115 
 
113 These interviews were primarily conducted by telephone for three reasons.  First, it 
significantly diversified the sample.  Second, many of the blind respondents do not live 
independently; talking by phone increased their comfort and ability to participate.  
Third, conducting all of the interviews by phone meant that sighted respondents could 
not see the interviewer, which reduced the chance that their visual perception of me 
would introduce interviewer bias.  If any bias was transmitted over the phone by the 
perception of having a racialized voice or surname, such bias would likely be uniform 
across blind and sighted respondents, making the data more comparable. 
114 Interviews with both blind and sighted respondents were semi-structured.  The interview 
questions were largely the same for both groups, but additional questions were 
occasionally asked to follow up on points made by the respondents or to allow them to 
clarify their answers.  Both sets of respondents were identified through snowball 
sampling.  For example, I started with three blind respondents identified through 
personal contacts and asked each of them to put me in contact with three additional 
blind people, and then repeated this process.  Blind respondents were also identified 
through Internet listserv postings. 
115 So that the experiences between the two groups were comparable, I tried to roughly 
balance various demographic categories such as respondents’ average age (44.5 years for 
blind respondents versus 47.1 years for sighted respondents) and proportions of White to 
non-White respondents (83.9% of the blind respondents identified as White and 16% 
identified as non-White, compared to 68% of the sighted respondents that identified as 
White and 32% that identified as non-White). 
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TABLE 1:  SAMPLE INFORMATION 
 Total In-
terviewed 
Qualifying 
Respond-
ents 
White Non-White Avg. 
Age 
Male/ 
Female 
States  
Blind 161 106 89
(83.9%)* 
17
(16%)* 
44.5 51/55 
(48.1%/ 
51.8%) 
34 
Sight-
ed 
25 25 17
(68%)* 
8 (32%)* 47.1 7/18 
(28%/ 
72%) 
6 
*of qualifying respondents 
The telephone interviews were recorded (with consent from each 
respondent) and transcribed by a third party.  HyperResearch qualitative 
research software was used to code and analyze the data. 
B.  Results116 
Two specific questions frame the findings from this research.  First, how 
do blind and sighted individuals understand race?  Secondly, if blind people 
understand race visually, how does this occur? 
1.  Sighted and Blind Respondents’ Visual Understanding of Race 
Sighted individuals largely have a visual understanding of race, meaning 
that visually obvious physical differences—skin color, facial features, etc.—
shape how they understand the boundaries that give salience to racial 
groupings.  This finding is strongly supported by the qualitative data 
 
116 Pseudonyms are used throughout the reporting of this data to conceal the respondents’ 
identities.  Qualitative researchers, particularly those using interview methodologies, 
often report their data using quasi-quantitative descriptors, e.g., “many,” “most,” “few,” 
etc., as opposed to numerical counts or proportions.  This is done to resist the 
overquantification of human dynamics that can undermine the richness of qualitative 
data.  I follow this approach in reporting the results in this Article.  See ROBERT S. WEISS, 
LEARNING FROM STRANGERS:  THE ART AND METHOD OF QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW STUDIES 
(1994).  See also, e.g., MARY C. WATERS, ETHNIC OPTIONS:  CHOOSING IDENTITIES IN 
AMERICA (1990); RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS:  THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS (1993); KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY:  
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS (1988); PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE 
COMMON PLACE OF LAW:  STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998). 
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collected for this Article,117 and should not be surprising.  Similarly, sighted 
respondents’ almost uniform belief that blind people have a diminished 
understanding of race due to their inability to see should not be particularly 
perplexing.118  But what is surprising is that blind and sighted people 
understand and experience race in a similar fashion:  visually. 
The data overwhelmingly show that, contrary to beliefs within the 
sighted community, race is not only significant to blind people, but is 
visually salient as a marker of visually distinguishable physical traits such as 
skin color and facial features.  Put differently, the visual aspects of race are 
what give it conceptual salience and significance to blind people—just as 
much as it does to their sighted counterparts.  The qualitative data 
conclusively bears this out.  For example, when asked what race is, blind 
respondent Amy notes that it “is physical attributes that are inherently 
unique to a group of people.”  Other blind respondents put a finer point on 
this idea.  Denny said, “race [is] skin color—color of one’s pigmentation,” 
while Brian said that for him, “race [is used] to distinguish Black, White, 
Asian, Hispanic . . . [based on] skin color.”  Carrie similarly said “I think of 
colors.  Varying colors in people’s skin colors.”  Several blind respondents 
acknowledged the irony in their emphasis on visual cues in conceptualizing 
racial difference.  Tyrone responded by saying race is “color.  Even though I 
can’t see, that is what I tend to think of.”  When asked what is the first thing 
that comes to mind when she hears the word “race,” Ginny said, “oddly I 
guess I would say skin color.  Even though that’s not really relevant to me.  
But that’s the first thing that comes to mind.” 
 
117 When asked how to define race, almost every sighted respondent emphasized visual 
differences as the key distinguishing factor.  One sighted respondent, Mallory, noted, 
“there are lots of different races, although when I say race [I mean] different colors of 
people.”  Another sighed respondent, Angie, said “obviously color of skin can come into 
play.  Just physical characteristics of race.  Hispanics typically have jet black hair.  Asians 
have . . . the almond slanted eye.  Just those type of things.  Again, dark hair.  Black, 
obviously color of skin.” 
118 When asked about their thoughts on blind people’s ability to comprehend race, one 
sighted respondent, Sarah, said if “they’ve been blind all their life, they probably don’t 
have any idea what [sighted people are] talking about when we say [race].  I don’t think 
they have any concept of it.”  When asked if she thought race is a problem for blind 
people, another sighted respondent, Jenny, said, “It shouldn’t be.  I don’t think so.  I 
don’t see how it could be.”  Even those few sighted respondents who thought blind 
people might understand race thought that this understanding would be impoverished, 
or at least not visually significant to them.  For example, sighted respondent Donny said 
that he thought race might be important to blind people since “yes there is a physical 
difference there but at the same time there is a cultural difference that can be identified 
more so than pure color.”  Similarly, Jamie thought that race might be significant to blind 
people despite their inability to see “because people sound different, and people act 
differently.  [If] they’ve been taught to fear [these distinctions], then they’ll fear it.” 
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This visual understanding of race also affects blind individuals’ own 
racial identities.  That is, blind people’s racial identities are shaped by a 
visual understanding of their own physical features that they cannot directly 
perceive.  For example, when asked if he racially identified a particular way, 
Nelson replied “I know that I was created with white skin, and that I’m 
White, but that’s just a fact of life.”  Mark said that he identified as White 
because “I know who I am, I know what I look like, so I’m White.”  Tara 
similarly noted that “I am Caucasian, but I don’t know if that has anything 
but skin, meaning to me.  Only the fact that I am.”  These types of answers 
were not unique to White blind respondents as the racial identity of blind 
racial minorities also revolved around an awareness of how they are visually 
perceived.  For example, Alex said that he identified as African American 
because “I [am] a little dark-skinned.”  Larry, another blind Black 
respondent, said he identified as Black because “I’m a dark skinned 
guy. . . . I’m a dark skinned brother with kinky hair and all the other basic 
Negroid features and all that good stuff.”  Amy says she identifies as African 
American because “I have the attributes . . . you know, I definitely have the 
thick hair and dark skin myself.”  When asked why he identified as Black, 
Tim laughed in acknowledging the irony of his response, and said “skin 
color.” 
This data begins to demonstrate the visual salience that race has for 
blind individuals, both in terms of how they racially identify others and 
themselves.  It is tempting to conclude that these responses only reflect a 
relatively superficial understanding of race among blind people that is 
indicative of a general awareness that people come in different colors.  But, 
the visual understanding of race within the blind community is, as it is in the 
sighted community, more complicated than this.  Race is not simply about 
skin color.  Rather, the blind respondents displayed a sophisticated 
appreciation for the constellation of cues—some non-visual—that 
nonetheless give race its visual salience.  For example, blind respondent Lia 
said that it is: 
[N]ot only skin color because it’s also [other] characteristics. . . . I know 
that various races like the Negroid race have the characteristic of 
[different] bone structure [and] facial structure.  Asians [also] have 
[different] facial structure [and] body structure.  I know that each race 
has its own set of characteristics to go with it.  Color can be a defining 
characteristic. But [race] is not only based on color. 
The visual significance of race becomes a primary filter through which to 
understand other aspects tied to race.  That is, the visual aspects of race take 
cognitive precedence over others, even for those who cannot see.  An 
example of this can be seen with how blind respondents understand the 
relationship between the visual cues tied to race and what they deemed to be 
secondary racial characteristics.  Sighted individuals often intuit that if blind 
people understand race, they can only appreciate it to the extent that it can 
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be experienced through non-visual senses, such as racialized differences in 
speech patterns or accents.  Sighted respondent Tamia highlights this 
common assumption when she said that race might be perceptible to blind 
people because “even though they can’t see, they can tell by a person’s voice.  
When your eyes are [not working], your other senses become stronger.  So, 
just because they can’t see, they can still tell by the voice whether they’re a 
black person or white person or Japanese or Chinese.”  But what is 
interesting is that the data suggest voice and accent do not become the 
primary mechanism for understanding racial difference.  Rather, it remains 
a secondary measure whose ultimate meaning is only relevant to blind 
respondents’ visual understanding of race, which remains primary.  For 
example, blind respondent Sandy said that vocal and linguistic differences 
do not “mean anything to me, except that I know that [the person has] a 
different skin color.  Jenny felt the same way, noting that hearing a person’s 
voice is only useful to her in as far as it helps her answer the question:  
“What would I see if I looked at you?”  This phenomenon of understanding 
the significance of secondary, non-visual racialized traits through the 
primacy of race’s visual salience repeats itself in other areas. 
The extent to which voice, surnames, and other seemingly racialized 
cues are secondary to blind people’s understanding of race draws further 
attention to the centrality of visual difference to their conceptions.  A skeptic 
may concede that the data presented thus far might support the conclusion 
that blind people have a visual understanding of race but that it is 
necessarily superficial; a cognitive awareness of the visual salience of race 
does not necessarily mean that visual understandings of race have a 
substantive impact on blind people’s day to day lives as it does for the 
sighted.  From this skeptical perspective, blind people are merely repeating 
the visual character of race that they hear about from their sighted 
colleagues without this visual aspect of race having any “real” meaning for 
their lives.  But such a conclusion underestimates the deep cognitive 
penetrance that visual understandings of race have for blind people.  Dating 
is one area that exemplifies how decisions and relationships are influenced 
by visual understandings of race that are as salient to blind people as they 
are to those who are sighted.  For example, blind respondent Davey 
described a blind White friend’s dating experience in college: 
He was going to college and he had started working with a reader.  She 
was very attractive to him, and he started seeing her.  Then, somebody 
told him that she was Black, and he broke it off.  He broke off the 
relationship.  He justified it by saying that it would not have worked, in 
the South, for a White man to be involved with a Black woman.  But 
that’s an incident that shows [how] once he learned that she was Black, 
the prejudice set in. 
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Kenny, a younger blind black male, offered an illuminating description 
about how such racial preferences in dating may be more prevalent than 
one might initially think: 
A lot of my black blind friends have sort of a joke because when someone 
doesn’t know our race—especially the males—they’ll find someway to 
reach out and touch our hair.  People want to know, and that’s the one 
[racial clue] they can always get . . . It’s a way for them to figure out [your 
race] if they don’t know . . . . I think [this happens] mostly in dating.  
You know, if they’re going to make some decisions.  I’ve seen people that 
seem sort of interested in someone and then discover that they’re Black 
and change their intentions.  I go to a lot of the conventions now, the 
national conventions [for the blind].  And there are people trying to 
meet somebody [to date].  You can see that they’re kind of pursuing 
somebody [that they find attractive].  And they’ll go for the hair and 
then they’ll change their mind.  They’re always still friendly.  I’ve never 
known anybody who just stopped talking to anybody altogether.  They’ll 
give themselves some time.  But you’re Black. 
This example highlights how a non-visual trait that is directly perceptible 
to a blind person through other means—here, hair texture—is sought out as 
a proxy for the visual cues associated with race as a way to determine the 
terms, limits, and boundaries of social interactions. 
The data presented thus far regarding blind people’s visual 
understanding of race begins to articulate this Article’s key finding.  If blind 
people understand race visually and orient their lives (such as dating) 
primarily around visual understandings of race just as much as sighted 
people do, then it is difficult to maintain, as equal protection jurisprudence 
strongly implies, that the salience of group characteristics stems from its 
visual obviousness.  Rather, it is becoming clear that this visual salience is 
produced by something else, which might be the more socially and legally 
relevant factor.  But if the salience is not merely self-evident, where does it 
come from? 
2.  Social Practices Produce Visual Understandings of Race 
The qualitative data show that rather than being obvious or self-evident, 
race becomes visually salient to blind (and sighted) individuals through 
social practices that train people to perceive human differences in particular 
ways.  For sighted people this socialization process is entwined with their 
visual engagement with the world, making it difficult to disentangle what is 
obvious and what is produced.  Blind people, on the other hand, are subject 
to the same social practices without the confounding visual stimuli and can 
thus detail the ways in which their visual understanding of race develops. 
Several blind respondents offered detailed explanations of how they 
were subjected to social practices that created their visual understanding of 
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racial differences.  For example, Mason described how he began to become 
attuned to the visual significance accorded to race: 
I began to be educated by people around me.  For example, I might be 
talking to someone, and I would not necessarily know [their race] 
because I’m not looking at them.  As far as I was concerned this was just a 
person, and someone would then come to me, and let me know that this 
person had been of a certain race, or color, or obvious ethnic origin 
which I would not have known.  Sometimes [they would] impart 
information about their assumptions about that person, and how I 
should or should not behave, or who I should or should not be talking 
to. 
Mason’s insights describe the racial rules of engagement that many 
people, blind and sighted, are subjected to in terms of how to interact with 
people from various racial groups.  But what is important to understand is 
that visual understandings of race are created by social exchanges that are 
not necessarily dramatic.  Rather, it is the routine description of everyday life 
through a racial lens that prioritizes the significance of human physical 
variation as an explanation for social order.  Blind respondent Gerald 
describes this dynamic: 
I was brought up to learn that I was White of course.  And unfortunately I 
learned that I was White so that White could be contrasted with Black.  
One of the first memories I have of learning about race was driving with 
my father downtown.  And he said “do you smell that smell?” and indeed 
there was a smell.  And I said yes.  And he said, “That’s the smell of 
nigger town.”  And I didn’t know what that meant.  But he was perfectly 
glad to tell me.  That is where the Negro lived.  And then he began to 
describe all the stereotypes with being a nigger or Negro.  At that time, 
there was supposed to be this difference.  If you were pretty good, you 
were a Negro.  Otherwise you were a nigger.  But it didn’t matter.  You 
still weren’t a White person and that’s the way it was.  He would say 
things like “you know what you smell is partly the way that they keep their 
houses and their yards and there’s just trash laying all around.  But
 then part of what you smell is just them.  They can’t help it.”  And then 
he would go on:  “well, they talk differently because they’re less educated 
and they’re less educated because they’re less capable of being 
educated.”  So pretty soon you begin to develop a race identity that kind 
of says wow, this is sad for them and sad for us too. 
This passage highlights a common theme throughout the qualitative 
data collected from blind respondents:  social interactions structure a 
particular understanding about the visual obviousness of race that is just as 
significant as that experienced by sighted individuals but is less accessible to 
them given their fixation on visual fields and their ability to portray some 
self-evident truth.  Sighted individuals are unable to “see” how social 
practices lead them to perceive human difference in particular ways.  Social 
practices shape the visual understandings of blind and sighted alike, training 
them to seek out and give meaning to visual distinctions that align with 
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social understandings of racial difference.  Blind people are just more 
capable of articulating the contours of these practices since they cannot be 
seduced by the appeal of vision as objective truth.  Jenny describes how these 
social practices that produce visual understanding of race can filter blind 
people’s other senses so as to give effect to an ostensible ability to “smell” 
racial differences: 
We had a babysitter named [Ellen], who is Black, and my stereotype of 
Black people, when I was growing up was that they sweated a lot.  Now, I 
don’t know why I learned that, but supposedly that was the truth.  And 
they were overweight, generally.  We had this babysitter, and I came 
down one morning and said [to my Mother], “What are you doing?”  She 
said, “I’m washing the counters” and I asked, “Why are you washing the 
counters?”  She said, “Well, because Black people smell, and your 
babysitter was here last night.”  And I said, “That’s interesting” and filed 
that away.  So, [Ellen] came the next week, and she was standing with her 
arm on the counter, and I walked up to the counter, and I sniffed it, and 
[Ellen] said, “What are you doing?” and I said, “Oh, I’m sniffing the 
counter, because my mom said you guys smell, and she’s right.  There’s a 
smell that’s different from ours on the counter.” 
Jenny is far from the only respondent in this sample to have professed an 
ability to smell differences between racial groups.119  But this passage 
highlights a common interaction that all people endure yet can be uniquely 
articulated by blind people, in terms of how human difference does not 
make a difference until that perceived line of difference is highlighted as a 
distinctly racial difference. 
It is important to reiterate that the social practices that produced the 
visual understanding of race among blind respondents did not only shape 
their racial perceptions in a cognitive manner, but also influenced how the 
 
119 For example, Christopher recalled this story: 
People from different races to me tend to smell different.  Now, usually the way I 
can identify someone of a different race is that they smell different than a 
Caucasian person.  Hispanic people smell different than Black people.  And Asians 
have their own odor.  But I’m not as familiar with it because I haven’t really been 
exposed to that many Asians.  But I’m sure if I had been that I’d be able to 
distinguish between the various Asians.  But what most comes to mind is Hispanic 
people smell very different than Caucasian people and Black people.  But 
Hispanics to me and even amongst the different Hispanics, like the Central 
American group tends to smell different from Mexicans.  But it’s a distinct odor.  
And I don’t think it’s related to diet either because . . . second and third 
generation Hispanics smell more similar to the first generation ones than White 
people would.  And they’re following an American diet.  There’s one particular 
case that I distinctly remember when I was in high school.  We had this one girl 
who was blonde and blue-eyed.  And she spoke perfect English.  And everybody 
thought that she was Caucasian.  And I would say no, she is Mexican obviously.  
And then it came up in conversation that her father was born in Mexico.  And 
even though she was blonde and blue-eyed, she was half Hispanic.  To me she 
smelled Hispanic.  So I knew she was Hispanic even though everybody else 
thought she was completely Caucasian. 
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respondents lived their day-to-day lives.  As previously mentioned, dating is a 
prime area to see how visual understandings of racial difference often affects 
blind people’s ability to date across the color line.  For example, Tim, a 
blind Black male, discussed his difficulties with interracial dating: 
I just love African-American women.  I don’t know why.  I had White 
friends that I hung out with, and we went to class together, and worked 
on projects together.  I just never had a desire to do that. . . . I tried it, 
but I just couldn’t gravitate to it.  I think I did it for about a week, and I 
was just like, “No, I can’t do this.” 
In the context of dating, race is often actively sought out by blind people 
to determine the nature and feasibility of any ongoing relationship—in part 
because social practices produce an awareness of the ways in which 
interracial relationships visually disrupt social norms pertaining to 
appropriate romantic and sexual partnering.  For example, Madge, a blind 
White female respondent, said: 
Race is important in terms of a date.  I remember meeting this guy at a 
program for the blind at the university.  And most of the guys there I 
wasn’t really that impressed with.  But this one guy, he really stood out.  
And I liked him and I enjoyed talking to him and stuff.  And when I 
found out that he was Black, I knew it wasn’t going to work for me.  But I 
felt kind of bad then, because I was hoping that it would [work out].  But 
that’s where [race] usually makes the most difference in my life. 
But race plays this important role of structuring the terms of human 
interactions beyond the realm of dating.  For example, blind respondent 
Tammy said that she finds information about a person’s race valuable since: 
[I]t makes it easier to interact with them [so] I won’t say a stupid 
thing . . . something like a statement that would be assuming that they’re 
White.  [It’s also important] just so that I can have equal access to 
information.  I can say it matches the information that the sighted person 
has.  It’s really important to me. 
Taken as a whole, the findings from this empirical research show that 
race is understood and experienced visually for both blind and sighted 
people.  This points to a shared social experience that makes race visually 
identifiable rather than it simply being known by visual observation—
empirical evidence that belies both the social and legal emphasis on visibility 
as the touchstone for race becoming salient.  In addition to showing that 
blind people understand race visually, the qualitative data exposes how the 
strong visual sensibility attached to race is produced by constitutive social 
practices that shape the social interactions of blind and sighted in almost 
indistinguishable ways. 
Although the “race” ipsa loquitur trope embedded in various aspects of 
law and society relies heavily on the idea that race visually speaks for itself, 
the data provide evidence that race is not merely a visually obvious 
phenomenon; its visual significance is produced, not simply observed.  Since 
these constitutive social practices come to light through examining blind 
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people’s experiences yet structure both blind and sighted people’s racial 
consciousness, this data suggests that it may be time to rethink the 
assumption embedded throughout equal protection jurisprudence that the 
salience of race stems from its visual obviousness.  In short, the empirical 
evidence suggests that “seeing race” has less to do with anything visually 
obvious about human bodies and more about the social practices that train 
us to look a certain way at them.  This suggests that the “race” ipsa loquitur 
trope that orients the scrutiny inquiry, colorblindness, and the intent 
doctrine may not only be misinformed, but may also fundamentally warp the 
Court’s understanding of how race becomes salient in a manner that can 
lead to remarkable injustices.  This will be further explored in the next 
section. 
IV.  WHY EMPIRICALLY DESTABILIZING THE “RACE” IPSA LOQUITUR 
TROPE MATTERS:  REORIENTING EQUAL PROTECTION AROUND SOCIAL 
PRACTICES 
This Article’s contribution is its empirical demonstration that visual 
understandings of race are created largely by social practices rather than 
mere observation—a contribution that is related to yet extends social 
constructionists’ demonstration of how meanings attach to bodies.  These 
findings suggest that visual understandings of race flourish regardless of 
vision; social practices produce a visual understanding of race that compels 
even blind people to “see” race and live their lives around the existence and 
social significance of racial boundaries.  Sighted people’s vision prevents 
them from grasping the role of social practices in producing the salience of 
race.  Blind people’s inability to be misled by the seemingly self-evident 
nature of race brings the production of race’s visual salience into focus, 
which allows us to understand the significance of social practices to the 
perceptibility of group differences in race and beyond.  Gerald, a blind 
respondent, nicely summarizes this concept: 
Race is very often not a mystery to blind people.  Which is in a sense kind 
of sad.  I think that sometimes [sighted] people look at blind folks and 
they think [that] these people can show us the way to a kind of Star Trek 
race blind society.  And it would be great if we could do that.  But we’re 
just as much a victim of racial prejudice, stereotypes, and misconceptions 
as anybody else.  And the fact that we’re not clued to it directly by vision 
doesn’t, in my mind, change that a bit.  I think that I suffer all of the 
unfortunate characteristics of my upbringing regarding race that my 
[sighted] brothers and sisters do. 
Ginny echoes this sentiment:  “I really don’t think it’s a matter of vision 
truthfully. . . . I was so amazed when this professor of mine had the premise 
[that blind people do not understand race.] . . . He said ‘well then you’re 
not prejudiced at all, are you?’  I thought [it’s] so odd that he thinks that 
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[it] is all about vision.”  Mason also corroborated this thought, noting that 
race is “very much a learned thinking and behavior that doesn’t have much 
to do with what you can see or not.” 
This empirical study of blind people’s understandings and experiences 
with race is relevant to equal protection to the extent that it calls into 
question the “race” ipsa loquitur sensibility embedded in this jurisprudence 
and suggests that it may distort important aspects of this area of law.  This 
section reviews some of the existing critiques of the scrutiny inquiry, 
colorblindness, and the intent doctrine to situate the contribution made by 
this Article’s normative claim:  that “race” ipsa loquitur must be thoroughly 
eviscerated from equal protection in order to pursue a new orienting theory 
of race that is sensitive to the ways in which social practices produce its 
salience.  This section will discuss how reorienting equal protection along 
these lines will lead to a more just and equitable jurisprudence. 
A.  The Scrutiny Inquiry 
Kenji Yoshino offers the most critical assessment of how the visibility of 
groups’ traits shapes the Court’s determination of whether a plaintiff is a 
member of a suspect class for equal protection purposes.  Yoshino is 
primarily concerned with what he calls equal protection’s assimilationist bias 
in which there is a presumption that groups distinguished by visible traits are 
particularly deserving of heightened scrutiny; subjugating groups without 
visually distinguishing traits to rational basis review effectively encourages 
them to assimilate to avoid discrimination.120  Yoshino sees this as an 
illegitimate response to discrimination deserving of greater constitutional 
protection—such as measures that discriminate against gays and lesbians—
and therefore argues that the immutability/visibility prong should be 
eliminated since it “[is a] bad prox[y] for either substantive inequality or 
processual powerlessness.”121 
But in critiquing the limits of the visibility prong to adequately capture 
which groups should be in or out, Yoshino’s perspective still lends itself to 
 
120 This is different from the “race” ipsa loquitur critique offered by this Article in that my 
focus is on how a particular theory of race shapes the Court’s equal protection inquiry.  
Yoshino’s visibility presumption is part of a discussion of the normative implications of 
how law thinks groups other than women and racial minorities should respond to 
discrimination, i.e. hiding or covering.  See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 
(2002) [hereinafter Yoshino, Covering]. 
121 Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection, supra note 23, at 570.  Yoshino argues that 
equal protection’s heightened scrutiny inquiry should be reconstituted on a process basis.  
He “propose[s] that the limiting principle should be a refined analysis of political 
powerlessness. . . . [A] multifactor determination of political powerlessness should 
perform the gatekeeping function performed by the immutability and visibility factors.”  
Id. at 565. 
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reifying the dividing line between “visible” and “invisible”—at least to the 
extent that this boundary is not the subject of critique and remains coherent 
in his formulation.122  Yoshino aptly notes the socially constructed notion of 
race—in terms of the way social meanings attach to bodies—and questions 
the stability of the Court’s distinction between corporeal and social traits in 
privileging the former for heightened scrutiny.  He argues that “there is no 
such thing as a purely biologically visible trait, for visibility is always 
relational, requiring a performer and an observer.”123  This 
acknowledgement of visibility’s social context is more sophisticated than 
other equal protection discussions on the visibility of group traits.  But, 
Yoshino’s emphasis on relationality and social context can and should be 
pushed further, especially given the empirical data discussed in Part III.  
Visibility, and specifically the salience of particular group traits, is not simply 
relationally known, ping ponging between the dichotomous categories of 
“visible” and “invisible” depending on context and audience.  This account 
does not sufficiently critique the coherency of “visibility” and “invisibility” as 
categories that capture race as not only something that is merely visible but 
salient.  Here lies the danger of reification; “visibility” and “invisibility,” 
though conceptualized as relational, can nonetheless sediment as an 
objectively known reality.  To the contrary, it is important to emphasize that 
there is a productive genealogy behind the salience of certain group traits 
that embed themselves in social structure that constitutes our ability to 
think, see, and be struck by what we see in certain ways.  Thus, the 
constitutive understanding of vision offered by this Article provides a richer 
account that goes beyond a discussion of the contexts that allow individuals 
to see in particular settings or relations and draws attention to the structural 
capacities that orient the way entire societies visually engage with the world.  It 
is the broader, structural understanding of race and vision that this Article 
identifies as a constitutive theory of race that complements yet extends 
existing social constructionist discourses. 
This matters because the lack of sociological nuance in the current 
three-prong approach inhibits a robust, and arguably more faithful, 
application of equal protection principles.  By demonstrating the social 
practices that produce the visual salience of race, the empirical data allow us 
to transcend the fragmented constitutional remedies that orient around the 
 
122 Yoshino notes that “the distinction between social and corporeal visibility is retained not 
because it is accurate, but because it accurately describes the intuition of the courts.” Id. 
at 498.  This explicitly questions the dividing line between what he terms “social” (e.g., 
religion) and “corporeal” (e.g., skin color) visibility found in the Court’s jurisprudence, 
but does not similarly critique the dichotomous categories “visible” and “invisible”—or, to 
put it differently, how certain bodies become visible—which retain some level of coherency. 
123 Id. at 498. 
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visibility of group traits to have a greater appreciation of how discriminatory 
social practices produce visible lines of group difference.  Thus, changing 
the directionality of this relationship—from visible traits → race salience to a 
different model where race salience (socially produced) → visibility of 
traits—allows for a more flexible understanding of how shifting social 
attitudes can produce, highlight, or minimize the visibility of certain groups 
depending on social contexts. 
Therefore, the take-home doctrinal point from putting these empirical 
findings in conversation with equal protection’s scrutiny inquiry is that 
treating race as self-evidently known and salient traits that justify the Court’s 
special solicitude trivializes equal protection by framing constitutionally 
impermissible discrimination as something that starts from the visual 
perception of obvious human difference.  Instead, the empirical findings 
discussed in Part III suggest that courts should examine the social practices 
that make certain human traits salient in the first place.  Re-orienting the 
scrutiny inquiry to focus on these social practices as a constitutional problem 
of first concern opens up a jurisprudential discussion of how the 
discriminatory treatment of certain groups currently not considered to be a 
suspect class—such as homosexuals and poor people—may nevertheless 
merit more than mere rational basis review due to the history of 
discrimination and current practices that produce their social salience (at 
times visible, and at times not) as targets for state-sponsored classifications 
that work against their group interest.124  Such an approach would alter the 
equal protection inquiry to be sensitive to the social practices of 
homophobia and classism that repeatedly make homosexuals and poor 
people the subject of discriminatory state actions, leading to a more 
sociologically robust jurisprudence.  This might engender a more coherent 
and consistent equal protection jurisprudence that places justice rather than 
deceptively self-evident categories of “visible” and “invisible” at the heart of 
the inquiry. 
B.  Colorblindness 
Part II.B.2. discusses the current literature critical of colorblindness, 
where several scholars have identified the social and political circumstances 
giving rise to a new form of politics and constitutionalism that discourages 
race consciousness in equal protection jurisprudence, even when done to 
 
124 For a discussion on homosexuals and poor people as putative suspect classes for equal 
protection purposes, see Renee Culverhouse & Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect 
Class, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 205 (1993); Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever:  
Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 629 (2008). 
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remedy ongoing inequality linked to past harms.  In this Article, I have taken 
colorblindness as a metaphor seriously in drawing attention to how its 
coherence turns upon a theory of race that frames its salience as a function 
of visual cues to imply that blindness or non-recognition can lead to a racial 
utopia.  The significance of this metaphorical coherence is not merely 
literary or rhetorical; empirical studies demonstrate how metaphors play 
upon our brains’ cognitive structure to fundamentally shape how we 
understand the world and our sense of justice.  Therefore, the data 
discussed in Part III disrupt the seemingly intuitive nature of the colorblind 
metaphor by demonstrating that its central organizing principle—that the 
salience of race is primarily a visual phenomenon and that non-recognition 
in and of itself facilitates equality—is empirically inaccurate.  As the many 
blind respondents report, race is experienced and understood as a visually 
salient characteristic in a manner that is no less complicated or fraught than 
it is for their sighted counterparts. 
Disrupting the colorblind metaphor’s coherence through empirical 
methods is important.  By offering qualitative data showing that the 
operating assumption behind the metaphor is simply inaccurate, the 
metaphor is rendered incoherent in a manner that raises piercing questions 
for the ideology and jurisprudence it supports.  This is not to say that the 
metaphor, in and of itself, is a primary driver of the ideology and 
jurisprudence.  Rather, it is to acknowledge that the metaphor leverages our 
cognitive abilities to shape our worldviews in a manner that gives undue 
legitimacy to an approach that can and should be disrupted by the available 
empirical evidence.  By focusing on the social practices that produce 
individuals’ ability to see the world in particular ways, this disruption draws 
attention to the need for alternative conceptions of society and human 
relationships that reflect reality.  Reorienting the normative commitments to 
equal protection around constitutive social practices rather than “race” ipsa 
loquitur suggests that colorblindness and its concomitant jurisprudence of 
non-recognition given coherence through the metaphor should be retired.  
Taking social practices seriously as the stimulant of race becoming visually 
salient suggests a new understanding of race that might inform this juris-
prudence in a manner that fully engages context and racial hierarchy in ful-
filling equal protection’s mandate. 
C.  Intent Doctrine 
Legal scholars have used theories of unconscious bias to critique the 
discriminatory intent requirement since the late 1980s.125  Implicit bias 
 
125 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning With Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (examining the discriminatory intent doctrine 
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research has resurrected the critique that requiring a legal finding of intent 
misses how racism operates in real life.126  By providing quantitative 
measures of bias through experimental measures such as the Implicit 
Association Test (“IAT”), this area of research has given greater empirical 
credence to notions that individuals often harbor unintentional sentiments 
that affect their human interactions—a perspective that raises severe if not 
fatal challenges for legal standards requiring direct proof of malice. 
The prospects of using these findings to inform law has stirred a zealous 
debate over whether courts and legislatures should give credence to studies 
based upon unconscious or implicit bias.  Not everyone agreess that implicit 
bias research is ripe enough to justify broad sweeping changes.  For 
example, Gregory Mitchell and Philip Tetlock argue127 that implicit bias 
measures suffer from serious methodological shortcomings pertaining to 
measurement,128 association,129 and predictability in real world settings.130  
 
through the lens of unconsicous motivation analysis).  Barbara Flagg develops a corollary 
theory of White transparency: 
The imposition of transparently white norms is a unique form of unconscious 
discrimination, one that cannot be assimilated to the notion of irrationalism that is 
central to the liberal ideology of racism.  While racial stereotyping can be 
condemned as the failure accurately to perceive the individual for who he really is, 
and bias as the inability to exclude subjective misconceptions or hostilities, or 
both, from one’s decisionmaking processes, transparency exemplifies the 
structural aspect of white supremacy.  Beyond the individual forms of racism that 
stereotyping, bias, and hostility represent lie the vast terrains of institutional 
racism—the maintenance of institutions that systematically advantage whites—and 
cultural racism—the usually unstated assumption that white culture is superior to 
all others.  Because the liberal gravitates toward abstract individualism and its 
predicates, she generally fails to recognize or to address the more pervasive harms 
that institutional and cultural white supremacy inflict.  The exercise of focusing 
exclusively on the transparency phenomenon as an exemplar of structural racism, 
then, has transformative potential for the white liberal, both on the personal level 
and as a springboard for reflection on what it means for government genuinely to 
provide the equal protection of the laws. 
  Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”:  White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of 
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 959 (1993) 
126 Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji note: 
The science of [implicit social cognition] examines those mental processes that 
operate without conscious awareness or conscious control but nevertheless 
influence fundamental evaluations of individuals and groups. . . . [E]vidence from 
hundreds of thousands of individuals [who have taken the IAT] across the globe 
shows that (1) the magnitude of implicit bias toward members of outgroups or 
disadvantaged groups is large, (2) implicit bias often conflicts with conscious 
attitudes, endorsed beliefs, and intentional behavior, (3) implicit bias influences 
evaluations of and behavior toward those who are the subject of the bias, and (4) 
self, situational, or broader cultural interventions can correct systematic and 
consensually shared implicit bias. 
  Jerry Kang & Mahzarin Banaji, Fair Measures:  A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative 
Action”, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006). 
127 See Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of 
Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006). 
128 Mitchell and Tetlock point to psychologists’ sharp disagreement over what the IAT 
measures.  Id. at 1086.  For example, mere familiarity with social norms linking race and 
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These concerns are not entirely without merit.  But, for the purposes of this 
Article, the IAT and other critiques of discriminatory intent based upon 
unconscious bias may also be limited to the extent that they largely speak to 
the social construction of race—how meanings come to attach to particular 
bodies—and not how race comes to be experienced and understood as a 
salient part of the social and legal world.  While it is crucially important to 
flesh out the cognitive biases that lead meanings to unconsciously attach to 
certain bodies in a manner that reflects social constructionism, it is equally 
important to understand the constitutive nature of how social practices 
produce the very visibility and coherence surrounding individuals’ 
experiences with racial difference.  Much of the intent inquiry—
theoretically, historically, and doctrinally entangled with colorblindness131—
 
pejorative group meanings (e.g., being aware of them without endorsing them) can lead 
to IAT scores indistinguishable from those harboring bona fide animus (e.g., those who 
are both aware and endorse applying pejorative meanings to certain groups).  See Sachiko 
Kinoshita & Marie Peek-O’Leary, Does the compatibility effect in the race Implicit Association 
Test reflect familiarity or affect?, 12 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 442, 450–51 (2005).  Other 
demonstrated explanations for poor IAT scores are feelings of empathy for minority 
groups and test anxiety linked to the fear of being called a bigot.  See Eric Luis Uhlmann 
et al., Are members of low status groups perceived as bad, or badly off?  Egalitarian negative 
associations and automatic prejudice, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 491 (2006) (arguing 
that many negative reactions to other races may be rooted in egalitarian feelings); 
Cynthia M. Frantz et al., A Threat in the Computer:  The Race Implicit Association Test as a 
Stereotype Threat Experience, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1611 (2004) 
(discussing how a test-taker’s fear of confirming racial stereotypes may affect how the test-
taker answers IAT questions).  Mitchell and Tetlock argue that implicit bias methodology 
has not been able to hash out unconscious bias from other variables that can produce 
depressed IAT scores.  Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 128, at 1086.  As a matter of 
science, this makes it difficult to definitively state that implicit bias is as widespread as IAT 
proponents make it out to be. 
129 The IAT relies upon individuals’ reaction times in tasks where they associate positive or 
negative words with group attributes.  Quicker reactions are understood as having a 
stronger association between, for example, “Blacks” and “lazy” or “Asian” and “smart.”  
However, Mitchell and Tetlock argue “psychometric studies have shown that a host of 
factors other than association strength can affect reaction time (e.g. cognitive flexibility, 
asymmetries in stimuli familiarity, and evaluation apprehension).”  Mitchell & Tetlock, 
supra note 128, at 1033.  By assuming that different reaction times only reflect attitudes 
and biases, Mitchell and Tetlock suggest that IAT proponents have not adequately 
designed their studies to take into account the effects of other variables. 
130 Mitchell and Tetlock argue that even if these measurement and association issues were 
resolved, proponents of using implicit bias research to redesign law have yet to 
demonstrate that “discriminatory conduct found in artificial laboratory settings reliably 
predict behavior in real-world settings that often have institutionalized layers of 
safeguards against the expression of prejudice.”  Id. at 1033.  The authors argue that in 
virtually every aspect of scientific research, laboratory findings do not necessarily express 
themselves in the real world.  Thus, to suggest legal change before any connection is 
made between laboratory IAT scores and discriminatory behavior in daily life is arguably 
premature. 
131 See generally López, Intentional Blindness, supra note 65. 
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orients around a particular reductionist understanding that disaggregates 
race from social context and hierarchy to recast it as a discrete trait that is 
purposefully targeted and presumptively self-evidently known.  The intent 
doctrine replicates a discreteness regarding race and how it is apprehended 
as well as comprehended that is sociologically inaccurate; social practices, 
not merely discrete, acontextual racial markers of human difference, give 
rise to the visual salience of race that often leads to discriminatory actions 
and experiences.  To the extent that the findings from the empirical 
components of this Article draw attention to the role of social practices in 
producing the visual salience of race, I argue that the intent doctrine also 
needs to be substantially revisited in favor of an approach that takes social 
practices, context, and racial hierarchy seriously. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Taken together, I conclude by arguing that the “race” ipsa loquitur thread 
of reasoning embedded in equal protection’s scrutiny inquiry, 
colorblindness, and intent doctrine must be thoroughly eviscerated.  The 
“race” ipsa loquitur sensibility reproduces a troubling typological conception 
of race and discrimination that overemphasizes what people look like to the 
detriment of having a more sophisticated understanding of the social 
practices that make certain groups visible targets of discrimination to begin 
with.  By emphasizing the productive genealogy of groups’ visual salience, I 
suggest a stronger engagement with the discriminatory social practices that 
produce the coherency of certain groups’ visibility—whether it be by race, 
class, religion, or any other characteristic central to individual and/or group 
identity.  The point here is not that vision does not matter.  Rather, the 
constitutionally relevant issue should be the social practices that make race a 
salient line of human difference. 
Equal protection’s emphasis on visibility distorts discussions on the 
nature of race and, more importantly, may obscure judicial deliberations of 
the most effective way to use racial categorizations thoughtfully.  Focusing 
on visibility privileges a certain way of thinking about race that historically 
has been intertwined with racial subordination, i.e., that race differences are 
real, tangible, and obvious rather than a product of social practices.  This 
not only hurts other groups facing discrimination, but creates an 
impoverished understanding of racial discrimination that ultimately 
disserves racial minorities and inhibits any true effort at creating a fair 
society.  Law must address the ways in which society trains us to think racially 
along typological lines of human difference that ultimately foster the very 
type of subordination that we must commit ourselves to eradicating. 
The point of the qualitative analysis and doctrinal critique presented in 
this Article is not to simply make sure law conforms to the empirical realities 
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of social life on the ground, but to encourage more sophisticated and 
responsible conceptions of race by legal actors and legal scholars.  It is time 
to begin a series of conversations about the future relationship between race 
and law, focusing in particular on what can be done to escape the 
reductionist theoretical quagmire that has defined race in American 
jurisprudence for the past four hundred years.  Thinking empirically about 
equal protection is an important first step. 
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